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What  determines  the  relationship  between  yield 
and  maturity  (the  yield  curve)  in the  money  market? 
A  resurgence  of  interest  in  this  question  in  recent 
years  has  resulted  in  a  substantial  body  of  new 
research.  The  focus  of much  of the  research  has been 
on  tests  of  the  “expectations  theory.”  According  to 
the  theory,  changes  in the  slope  of  the  yield  curve 
should  depend  on interest  rate  expectations:  the  more 
market  participants  expect  rates  to  rise,  the  more 
positive  should  be  the  slope  of  the  current  yield 
curve.  The  expectations  theory  suggests  that  vari- 
ation  in  the  slope  of  the  yield  curve  should  be 
systematically  related  to  the  subsequent  movement 
in  interest  rates.  Much  of  the  recent  research  has 
focused  on  whether  this  prediction  of  the  theory  is 
supported  by  the  data.  A  surprising  finding  is that 
parts  of the  yield  curve  have  been  useful in forecasting 
interest  rates  while  other  parts  have  not. 
A novel  and  interesting  aspect  of  some  of the  re- 
cent  literature  is  its  emphasis  on  the  possible  role 
of monetary  policy  in explaining  the  behavior  of the 
yield  curve.  This  literature  views  the  Federal 
Reserve’s  policy  instrument  as the  federal  funds  rate, 
and  it  posits  that  money  markets  rates  at  different 
maturities  are  strongly  influenced  by  current  and 
expected  levels  of  the  funds  rate.  In  this  view,  ex- 
plaining  the  behavior  of  the  yield  curve  requires 
understanding  how  the  Federal  Reserve  moves  the 
funds  rate  over  time.  A  key  paper  in  this  area 
(Ma&w  and Miron  [ 1986]),  for example,  argues  that 
the  pexuhvzce  of  changes  in  the  federal  funds  rate 
engineered  by  the  Federal  Reserve  helps  explain  why 
the  yield  curve  from  three  to  six  months  has  had 
negligible  forecasting  power. 
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Associates,  San  Francisco,  California.  The  authors  benefitted 
from  comments  by  Marvin  Goodfriend,  Ward  McCarthy,  Yash 
Mehra,  and  Roy  Webb.  They  are  also  grateful  to  J.  Huston 
McCulloch  for providing  interest  rate  data  used  in the  paper  and 
to  the  publishers  of the  Washington  Bond d  Money  Market  Report 
for  permitting  use  of  their  survey  data  on  interest  rate 
expectations. 
This  paper  surveys  the  recent  literature  on  the 
determinants  of the  yield  curve.  It begins  by  review- 
ing the  expectations  theory  and recent  empirical  tests 
of the  theory.  It  discusses  two  general  explanations 
for the  lack of support  for the  theory  from  these  tests. 
Finally,  the  paper  discusses  in  more  detail  the 
behavior  of market  participants  that  might  influence 
the  yield  curve,  and  the  role  that  monetary  policy 
might  play  in  explaining  this  behavior. 
I. 
THE EXPECTATIONS  THEORY 
Concepts 
Two  concepts  central  to  the  tests  of the  expecta- 
tions  theory  reviewed  below  are  the  “forward  rate 
premium”  and  the  “term  premium.”  Suppose  an in- 
vestor  can  purchase  a six-month  Treasury  bill  now 
or purchase  a three-month  bill now  and  reinvest  his 
funds  three  months  from  now  in another  three-month 
bill. The  forward  rate  is the  hypothetical  rate  on  the 
three-month  bill  three  months  in  the  future  that 
equalizes  the  rate  of  return  from  the  two  options, 
given  the  current  three-  and  six-month  rates.’  The 
forward  rate  calculated  from  the  current  six-month 
rate  (R6)  and  the  current  three-month  rate  (R3), 
which  we  denote  F(6,3),  is  defined  as: 
(1  +  R6)  =  (1  +  R3)(1  +  F(6,3)),  or 
F(6,3)  =  [(l  +R6)/(1  +R3)]  -  1 
(1) 
where  the  yields  are  simple  unannualized  yields. 
Virtually  all of  the  studies  surveyed  in this  paper 
use  continuously  compounded  yields,  which  enable 
the  forward  rate  to  be  expressed  as  an  additive 
(rather  than  a multiplicative)  function  of the  current 
six-  and  three-month  rates.  Using  continuously 
1 The  intuition  behind  the  term  “forward  rate”  is that  a market 
participant  who  can  borrow  and  lend  at currently  quoted  three- 
and  six-month  rates  can  fix  the  rate  at  which  he  borrows  or 
lends  funds  three  months  forward  by  an  appropriate  set  of 
current  transactions.  See  Shiller  11987,  pp.  6-71. 
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lower  case  letters)  the  forward  rate  becomes? 
f(6,3)  =  2r6  -  r3  (2) 
The  “forward  rate  premium”  is  defined  as  the  dif- 
ference  between  the  forward  rate  and  the  current 
short-term  spot  rate: 
f(6,3)  -  r3  =  (2r6-r3)  -  r3  =  Z(r6 -r3)  (3) 
When  the  maturity  of the  long-term  rate  is twice  the 
maturity  of the  short-term  rate,  as  in this  case,  the 
forward  rate  premium  is simply  twice  the  spread  be- 
tween  the  long-  and  short-term  rates. 
The  “term  premium  (0)” is generally  defined  as the 
difference  between  the  forward  rate  and  the  cor- 
responding  expected  spot  rate: 
8  =  f(6,3)  -  Er(3:t+3),  (4) 
where  r(3:t  +3)  denotes  the  three-month  rate  three 
months  in  the  future  and  E  denotes  the  current 
expectation  of that  rate.  Spot  and  forward  rates  not 
followed by a colon are measured  as of time “t”. Qua- 
tion  (4) can  be rewritten  in terms  of the  forward  rate 
premium  by  rearranging  terms  and  subtracting  r3 
from  both  sides: 
f(6,3)  -  r3  =  [Er(3:t+3)  1  r3]  +  8  (5) 
This  expression  now  decomposes  the  forward  rate 
premium  into  the  expected  change  in interest  rates 
and  a  term  premium. 
To  illustrate  these  concepts,  suppose  the  current 
three-month  rate  is 6 percent,  the  current  six-month 
rate  is 7 percent,  and  the  expected  three-month  rate 
three  months  in the  future  is 7 ‘/z percent.  Then  the 
implied  forward  rate  on a three-month  security  three 
months  in  the  future  is  8 percent  and  the  forward 
2 The  relationship  between  a  simple  yield  (R)  and  the  corre- 
sponding  continuously  compounded  yield  (r)  is: 
(l+R)  =  exp(r). 
Hence,  using  continuously  compounded  yields,  equation  (1) in 
the  text  can  be  rewritten: 
exp(r6)  =  exp(r3)exp(f(6,3)), 
which  taking  logarithms  of  both  sides  becomes: 
f(6,3)  =  r6  -r3. 
If we  now  let  the  lower  case  letters  stand  for annualized con- 
tinuously  compounded  yields,  the  expression  for the  forward  rate 
becomes: 
l/qf(6,3)  =  %r6  -  Gr3,  or 
f(6,3)  =  2r6  -r3. 
rate  premium  is  2 percentage  points.  The  forward 
rate  premium  can  be  decomposed  into  an expected 
change  in  the  three-month  rate  of  1 Yz percentage 
points  and  an expected  term  premium  of ‘/2 percen- 
tage  point. 
An  equivalent  decomposition  of the  forward  rate 
premium  used  in some  papers  employs  the  concept 
of “holding  period  yield,”  which  is the  return  earned 
on a security  sold prior  to maturity.  The  forward  rate 
premium  can be divided  into  (1) the  expected  change 
in  the  three-month  rate  and  (2)  the  difference  be- 
tween  the  expected  holding  period  yield  earned  by 
investing  in  a  six-month  bill  and  selling  it  when  it 
is  a  three-month  bill  three  months  in  the  future, 
Eh(6,3:t  +3),  and the return  from investing  in a three- 
month  bill? 
f(6,3)  -  r3  =  [Er(3:t  +3)  -  r3] 
+  [Eh(6,3:t+3)  -  r3]  (6) 
In  the  above  example,  the  forward  rate  premium 
of 2 percentage  points  can  be  decomposed  into  an 
expected  change  in  the  short-term  rate  of  1 Yz per- 
centage  points  and  an  expected  excess  return  of  ‘/2 
percentage  point  for holding  six-month  bills for three 
months  rather  than  investing  in  three-month  bills. 
Assumptions 
The  “expectations  theory”  is based  on two assump- 
tions  about  the  behavior  of participants  in the  money 
market.  The  first  is  that  the  term  premium  that 
market  participants  demand  for  investing  in  one 
maturity  rather  than  another  (and  issuers  are willing 
to pay  to issue  that  maturity)  is constant  over  time.4 
Under  this  assumption  equation  (5)  becomes: 
Er(3:t+3)  -  r3  =  -c  +  [f(6,3)  -  r31  (7) 
where  c is now  a constant  term  premium.  Note  that 
equation  (7) can  be  rewritten  using  equation  (3) as: 
r6  =  %c  +  %[r3  +  Er(3:t+3)],  (8) 
which  says  that  under  the  expectations  hypothesis 
the  long-term  rate  is equal  to  an  average  of the  cur- 
rent  and  expected  short-term  rates  plus  a constant 
which  reflects  the  term  premium. 
3 Fama  (1986,  pp.  180-1821  and  Fama  and  Bliss  (1987,  pp. 
681-6823  derive  this  decomposition. 
4 Some  papers  equate  the  term  “expectations  theory”  with  the 
assumption  of a constant  term  premium,  while  others  include 
the  hypothesis  of rational  expectations  (discussed  below)  as part 
of  the  theory.  In  this  paper  we  follow  the  latter  procedure. 
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empirical  work  testing  the  expectations  hypothesis. 
Researchers  using  equation  (7)  to  test  the  expec- 
tations  hypothesis  do  not  know  the  values  of 
Er(3:t  +3).  The  procedure  generally  used  to get these 
values  is to assume  that  interest  rate  expectations  are 
formed  “rationally,”  so  that: 
r(3:t  +3)  =  Er(3:t  +3)  +  e:t+3,  (9) 
where  e:t + 3 is a forecast  error  that  has  an expected 
value  of zero  and  is assumed  to be uncorrelated  with 
any information  available  at time  t. The  ideas  behind 
the  rational expectations  assumption  are that  (1) there 
is a stable  economic  environment,  (2)  market  par- 
ticipants  understand  this  environment,  (3) therefore, 
they  should  not  systematically  over- or under-forecast 
future  interest  rates,  and  (4) they  should  not  ignore 
any readily  available  information  that  could  improve 
their  forecasts.  This  assumption  specifically  requires 
that  forecast  errors  are  not  correlated  with  the  for- 
ward  rate  premium  at time  t or its two  components, 
the  expected  change  in  interest  rates  and  the  ex- 
pected  term  premium.  Substituting  (9) into  (7) yields 
the  following  regression  equation: 
r(3:t+3)  -  r3  =  a  +  b[f(6,3)  -  r3] 
+  u:t+3  (10) 
Under  the  rational  expectations  assumption  the 
error  term  in equation  (10)  is uncorrelated  with  the 
right-hand  side  variable  so that  the  coefficient  b can 
be  estimated  consistently.  The  theory  predicts  that 
b should  not  differ  significantly  from  one.  A signifi- 
cantly  different  value  would  contradict  either  the 
assumption  of a fixed  term  premium  or the  rational 
expectations  assumption.5  An  estimated  coefficient 
of  zero  would  be  evidence  that  the  forward  rate 
premium  has no forecasting  power  for the subsequent 
behavior  of  the  three-month  rate. 
While  equation  (10)  is the  most  common  regres- 
sion  estimated  in this  literature,  a number  of other 
specifications  have  also  been  used.6  An  alternative 
5 We  discuss  in  detail  in  Sections  III  and  IV  and  in  Appendix 
II  the  expected  effect  on  the  estimate  of “b”  if either  of these 
assumptions  is  not  valid. 
6 Campbell  and  Shiller  119891 derive  and  estimate  two  other 
specifications  to  test  the  expectations  theory  using  a  short 
m-period  rate and  a longer  n-period  rate.  In the fust  the  difference 
between  the  yield on an n -m  period  bond  m periods  ahead  and 
the  current  yield  on  an  n-period  is  regressed  on  the  spread 
between  the  current  n-period  and  m-period  rates,  where  the 
spread  is  weighted  by  m/(n-m).  In  the  second  a  weighted- 
average  change  of the  m-period  rate  over  (n -  m)/m  periods  is 
regressed  on  the  current  spread  between  the  n-period  and 
m-period  rates. 
used  by Fama  [1984a,  1986)  replaces  the,change  in 
the three-month  rate in equation  ( 10) with the holding 
period  premium: 
h(6,3:t+3)  -  r3  =  al  +  bl[f(6,3)  -  r3] 
+  u:t+3  (11) 
The  estimates  of the  coefficients  of equation  (11) 
provide  the  same  information  as  the  estimates  of 
equation  (10) because  the  dependent  variables  in the 
two  equations  sum  to  the  common  independent 
variable  (as indicated  by equation  6).  Hence,  b plus 
bl  equal  one,  and  the  sum  of the  constants  in the 
two  equations  equals  zero.’  A  value  of  bl  greater 
than  zero  is evidence  that  the  current  yield curve  has 
forecasting  power  for the  excess  return  earned  by in- 
vesting  in six-month  bills for three  months  over  the 
return  from  investing  in three-month  bills. Given  the 
rational  expectations  assumption,  a value  of b 1 equal 
to  one  would  indicate  that  all variation  in the  yield 
curve  is due  to variation  in expected  excess  returns 
(i.e.  the  term  premium)  and  none  due  to  variation 
in  the  expected  change  in  rates. 
II. 
REGRESSION ESTIMATES 
Three  major  sets  of postwar  monthly  interest  rate 
data  have  been  used  by  the  studies  surveyed  in this 
article  to  estimate  equations  (10)  and  (11):  (1) 
Treasury  yields  from  the  Center  for  Research  in 
Security  Prices  (CRSP)  at the  University  of Chicago, 
(2) Yield series  constructed  from  Treasury  rate  data 
by  a  cubic  spline  curve-fitting  technique  by 
McCulloch  [1987]  and  (3)  Yields  for  Treasury  and 
private  sector  securities  from  Salomon  Brothers’  An 
Analytcal  Record of Yields and  Yield Spmads.  In addi- 
tion,  Hardouvelis  [1989]  uses  weekly  data  on 
Treasury  bills obtained  from  the  quotation  sheets  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  Bank of New  York,  and Mankiw 
and  Miron  [1986]  construct  a  quarterly  series  on 
three-  and  six-month  loan  rates  at New  York  banks 
from  1890  through  1958.  The  regression  results  we 
report  in  this  paper  use  the  McCulloch  data  for 
Treasury  rates  and  the  Salomon  Brothers  data  for 
private  sector  rates.  We also used Treasury  rates from 
the  CRSP  data  and  the  Salomon  Brothers  data  and 
found  little difference  in the  results.  All interest  rates 
used  in the paper  are converted  to continuously  corn- 
pounded  annual  rates  as described  in the  Appendix  I. 
7 This  statement  is correct  if the  long  maturity  (n)  is  equal  to 
twice  the  short  maturity  (m).  If n  is not  equal  to  Zm,  then  the 
statement  is still  true  if the  dependent  variable  is multiplied  by 
an  appropriate  constant. 
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The  standard  test  of the  expectations  theory  uses 
a long-term  rate  with  a maturity  equal  to  twice  that 
of the  short  rate.  Numerous  studies  have  used  the 
three-  and six-month  rates  to calculate  a three-month 
forward  rate  three  months  in the  future  and estimate 
the  coefficients  of  equation  (10)  or  a  comparable 
equation  using  data  over  the  postwar  period.  These 
include  Hamburger  and  Platt  [ 197.51, Mankiw  and 
Miron  [ 19861,  Mankiw  and  Summers  [ 19843,  and 
Shiller,  Campbell  and  Schoenholtz  [ 19831. All these 
studies  report  coefficients  for  the  forward  rate 
premium  that  are not  significantly  different  from zero, 
indicating  that  the  yield  curve  from  three  to  six 
months  has  had  negligible  power  to  forecast  the 
changes  in the  three-month  rate.  Fama  [ 1986)  finds 
that  the  Treasury  bill yield  curve  from  six to twelve 
months  has  had  no forecasting  power  for the  subse- 
quent  six-month  rate,  although  he  does  find  some 
forecasting  power  for  the  CD  yield  curve  from  six 
to  twelve  months.8 
The  lack  of  support  for  the  expectations  theory 
using  postwar  Treasury  bill rates  at the  three-,  six-, 
and  twelve-month  maturities  is shown  in the  top  of 
Table  I,  which  reports  regression  results  using  the 
McCulloch  data.9  Table  I also  shows  little  support 
for  the  theory  using  private  security  rates.  The 
coefficients  in these  regressions  all are  positive,  but 
only  one  is significant  at the  five percent  level,  and 
the  explanatory  power  of  the  regressions  is  negli- 
gible.  The  results  for the  private  rates  are  similar  to 
those  reported  by  Fama  [ 19861,  except  that  his 
dependent  variable  is the  holding  period  premium 
so  that  his  coefficients  are  roughly  1  minus  the 
coefficients  reported  in  Table  I. 
Mankiw  and  Miron  [ 19861 estimate  equation  (10) 
from  1890  to  1914,  prior  to  the  founding  of  the 
* Also,  Hendershott  [ 19841 finds  forecasting  power  for  the  bill 
yield  curve  from  six  to  twelve  months  after  adding  unexpected 
changes  in inflation  and  unexpected  changes  in  other  variables 
to  his  estimated  equation. 
9 The  forecast  horizon  in  these  regressions  is generally  longer 
than  the  monthly  period  between  observations.  As a result  there 
will  likely  be  serial  correlation  in  the  error  term  of the  regres- 
sions.  For  example,  a  regression  of  the  three-month  change 
in  the  three-month  rate  on  the  forward  rate  premium  using 
monthly  three-  and  six-month  rates  will  likely  generate  a 
moving  average  error  term  of order  2 because  the  forecasts  in 
months  two  and  three  are  made  before  the  error  from  month 
one’s  forecast  is  known.  The  standard  errors  provided  in  the 
tables  are  calculated  using  the  consistent  variance-covariance 
estimate  from  Hansen  119821 with  the  modification  by  Newey 
and  West  119873. For  discussion  of this  procedure  see  Mishkin 
11988,  pp.  307-3091 
Federal  Reserve,  and over four subperiods  from  19 14 
through  1979.  They  find  that  the  spread  between 
the  six-  and  three-month  rates  had  substantial 
forecasting  power  for  the  three-month  rate  only  in 
the  period  prior  to  1914.  In fact,  the  estimated  slope 
coefficient  in  this  period  is only  slightly  below  the 
value  predicted  by  the  expectations  theory.  We 
discuss  this  interesting  result  in more  detail  below. 
Estimates  of  Non-Standard  Regressions 
A number  of recent  studies  also report  regression 
results  for sections  of the  yield  curve  over  which  the 
maturity  of the  long-term  rate  is not  equal  to  twice 
that  of  the  short  rate.  One  type  of  regression 
measures  the  “cumulative”  predictive  power  of the 
slope  of the  yield  curve  between  a one-period  rate 
and  longer-term  rates  at various  maturities.  For  ex- 
ample,  we  can  estimate  the  predictive  power  of the 
yield  curve  from  one  to  six  months  with  the 
regression: 
r(l:t+S)  -  rl  =  a  +  b[(f6,5)  -  rl] 
+  u:t+s  (12) 
The  dependent  variable  in  this  regression  is  the 
change  in the  one-month  rate  over  the  following  five 
months.  The  independent  variable  is the  difference 
between  the  forward  rate  for  a one-month  bill  five 
months  in the  future  and the  current  one-month  spot 
rate.  The  forward  rate  on  a  one-month  bill  five 
months  in the  future  can  be  calculated  from  the  cur- 
rent  five-  and  six-month  yields  -  hence,  the  nota- 
tion  f(6,.5).i”  A coefficient  of  1 for  b  in this  regres- 
sion  supports  the  expectations  hypothesis,  and  a 
coefficient  less  than  1 but  significantly  greater  than 
zero  provides  evidence  that  the  yield  curve  over  this 
range  has forecasting  power  for the  subsequent  move- 
ment  in  rates. 
A second  type  of non-standard  regression  estimates 
the  “marginal”  ability  of small  sections  of the  yield 
curve  to forecast  the  subsequent  movements  in rates 
over  a corresponding  future  period.  For  example,  the 
predictive  power  of the  yield  curve  for  the  change 
in  rates  from  four  to  five  months  in  the  future  can 
be  estimated  with  the  regression: 
r(l:t  +5)  -  r(l:t  +4)  =  a  +  b[f(6,5)  -  f(.5,4)] 
+  u:t+s  (13) 
where  the  dependent  variable  is the  change  in  the 
one-month  rate  from four to five months  in the future 
10  The  formula  used  to  calculate  the  forward  rate  on  an  n-m 
month  bill  m  months  in  the  future  is: 
f(n,m)  =  [l/(n  -m)][nr(n)  -  mr(m)j. 
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Treasury  Bills 
r(3:t+3)  -  r3 
r(6:t+6)  -  r6 
r(3:t+3)  -  r3 
r(6:t+6)  -  r6 
Table  I 
ESTIMATES  OF THE  STANDARD  REGRESSION  (n =2rd* 
r(m:t+m)  -  rm  =  a  +  b[f(n,m)  -  rml  +  u:t+m 
Certificates  of  Deposit 
r(3:t+3)  -  r3 
r(6:t+6)  -  r6 
Eurodollars 
r(3:t+3)  -  r3 
Commercial  Paper 
r(3:t+3)  -  r3 
a  - 
0.10  -0.15 
(0.09)  (0.19) 
0.04  0.04 
(0.17)  (0.30) 
0.13  -0.20 
(0.15)  (0.22) 
0.04  -0.01 





-0.06  0.38 
(0.20)  (0.25) 
- 0.02  0.40 


















0.02  66: 12-86:8 
0.03  66: 12-86:8 
66: 12-86:8 
71: lo-86:8 
*  Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses  and  are  calculated  as  described  in  footnote  9.  Interest  rates  are  continuously  compounded 
annual  rates  in  percentage  points.  “m”  and  “n”  refer  to  maturity  in  months. 
and  the  independent  variable  is  the  difference  be- 
tween  the  one-month  forward  rate five months  in the 
future  (calculated  from the current  five- and six-month 
rates)  and  the  one-month  forward  rate  four  months 
in the  future  (calculated  from  the  current  four-  and 
five-month  rates).  A coefficient  not  significantly  dif- 
ferent  from one supports  the expectations  hypothesis, 
and a coefficient  less than  one but  significantly greater 
than  zero  provides  evidence  that  the yield curve  from 
four to six months  has predictive  power  for the  move- 
ment  in the  one-month  rate  four  to  five  months  in 
the  future. 
Estimates  for  the  non-standard  regressions  using 
the  McCulloch  data  are  shown  in  Table  II.  The 
estimates  of  the  cumulative  regressions  in  the  top 
of the  table  show  positive  and  steadily  declining  co- 
efficients  over  the  money  market  yield  curve  out  to 
six months,  although  only  the  coefficient  in the  first 
regression  is significant  at the  5 percent  level.  The 
results  of the  marginal  predictive  power  regressions 
show  that  virtually  all of the  forecasting  power  of the 
bill  yield  curve  is  in  the  spread  between  the  one- 
month  ahead  one-month  forward  rate  and  the  cur- 
rent  one-month  spot  rate. 
Fama  [1984a]  estimates  cumulative  and  marginal 
predictive  power  regressions  using  Treasury  bill 
rates  with maturities  up to six months  from the CRSP 
data  from  1959  through  1982,  and  Mishkin  [1988] 
repeats  Fama’s  regressions  using  the  same  data  set 
extended  through  1986.  Both  studies  report  full 
sample  results  for  the  cumulative  predictive  power 
regressions  roughly  similar  to  those  reported  in the 
top  of Table  II.  One  difference  is that  Fama  finds 
coefficients  significant  at the  five percent  level  in his 
regressions  covering  the  cumulative  change  in rates 
one,  two,  and three  months  in the future,  and Mishkin 
finds  significant  coefficients  in regressions  covering 
the  cumulative  change  in rates  one  and  two  months 
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ESTIMATES  OF  NON-STANDARD  REGRESSIONS* 
A.  Cumulative  Regressions:  r(l:f+n-l)-rl  =  a  +  b[f(n,n-U-r11  +  u:t+n-1 
Dependent  Variable  a  b  - 
r(l:t+  1) -rl  -0.18  0.50 
(0.04)  (0.12) 
r(l:t+2)-rl  -0.19  0.36 
(0.11)  (0.20) 
r(l:t+3)  -rl  -0.21  0.33 
(0.14)  (0.21) 
r(l:t+4)  -rl  -0.04  0.09 
(0.10)’  (0.15) 
r(l:f+5)-rl  0.03  0.02 
(0.12)  (0.14) 






B.  Marginal  Regressions:  r(l:t+n-l)-r(l:t+n-2)  =  a  +  b[f(n,n-l)-f(n-l,n-2)l  +  u:t+n-1 
Dependent  Variable  a  b  R2  - 
r(l:t+  U-r1 




-0.18  0.50  0.09 
(0.04)  (0.12) 
-0.01  0.12  0.00 
(0.06)  (0.21) 
0.02  -0.07  0.00 
(0.04)  (0.14) 
- 0.00  0.09  0.00 
(0.04)  (0.20) 
-0.03  0.62  0.02 
(0.04)  (0.34) 
*Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  Interest  rates  are  continuously  compounded  annual  rates  in  percentage  points.  “n”  refers  to  maturity 
in  months.  Estimation  period  is  1952:l  to  1986:8. 
in the  future.  As with  the  McCulloch  data,  however, 
the  full sample  marginal  predictive  power  regressions 
reported  by Fama  and  Mishkin  have  significant  coef- 
ficients  only  in the  regression  for the  change  in rates 
one  month  ahead,  r( 1:t + 1)  -  rl,  confirming  that 
virtually  all of the  forecasting  power  of the  bill yield 
curve  is  in  the  shortest  maturities. 
Fama  estimates  subperiod  regressions  for  1959  to 
1964,  1964  to  1969,  and  1969 to  1982,  and Mishkin 
reports  regressions  for these  subperiods  and  also for 
1982  to  1986.  They  find  that  in each  subperiod  the 
difference  between  the  one-month  ahead  one-month 
forward  rate  and the  current  spot  rate  had forecasting 
power  for the  movement  in the  one-month  rate  over 
the  following  month.  They  also  find  that  in  some 
subperiods-notably  those  in the  1960s-the  differ- 
ence  between  the  two-month  ahead  forward  rate  and 
the  one-month  ahead  forward  rate  had  significant 
forecasting  power  for the  change  in rates  one  to two 
months  in  the  future. 
Hardouvelis  [ 19881 uses  weekly  data  on Treasury 
bill rates  from  1972  through  198.5 to  calculate  two- 
week  forward  rates  at  one  week  intervals  from  one 
to  twenty-four  weeks  in  the  future.  Hardouvelis 
estimates  coefficients  for  cumulative  and  marginal 
forecasting  regression  equations  over  three  periods 
corresponding  to  three  Federal  Reserve  policy 
regimes  from  1972  through  October  1979,  October 
1979  through  October  1982,  and  October  1982 
through  November  1985.  In the  first period  the  yield 
8  ECONOMIC  REVIEW.  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1990 curve  has forecasting  power  for only one week,  while 
in  the  latter  two  periods  the  marginal  forecasting 
power  of the  yield  curve  lasts  eight  or  nine  weeks. 
These  results  are  roughly  consistent  with  those  of 
Fama  and Mishkin,  who  also find that  the  forecasting 
power  of the  money  market  yield  curve  was weakest 
in  the  1970s.”  A  striking  feature  of  Hardouvelis’ 
results  is that  the  coefficient  in the  regression  for the 
one  week  ahead  change  in rates  is close  to  1 in each 
of  the  three  periods,  which  suggests  that  in  these 
periods  the  shortest  end  of the  yield  curve  behaved 
closely  in accordance  with  the  expectations  theory. 
The  Forecasting  Power  of  the  Yield  Curve 
from  One  to  Five  Years 
A  final  set  of  regression  results  that  we  briefly 
review  relate  to  the  forecasting  power  of the  yield 
curve  from  one  to five years.  Fama  and  Bliss [ 19871 
find  that  the  yield  curve  from  one  to  five years  has 
had  substantial  forecasting  power  for  the  change  in 
rates  over  the  following  three  or four  years.  For  ex- 
ample,  they  find that  the  difference  between  the  for- 
ward  rate  on a one-year  Treasury  security  four years 
in the  future  (calculated  from  the  current  four-  and 
five-year  rates)  and the  current  one-year  rate explains 
48  percent  of the  variance  of the  4-year  change  in 
the  one-year  rate.  Table  III reports  these  regressions 
using  the  McCulloch  data.  The  results  are generally 
similar  to those  reported  by Fama,  although  the  ex- 
planatory  power  of the  four-year  rate  change  regres- 
sion  is  smaller. 
Campbell  and  Shiller  [1989]  use  the  McCulloch 
data  to  test  a different  specification  of the  expecta- 
tions  theory  in which  the  current  spread  between  an 
n-period  maturity  rate  (such  as a five-year  rate)  and 
a shorter  m-period  maturity  (one-year)  rate  forecasts 
a weighted  average  change  of the  m-period  rate  over 
the  next  n -  1 periods  (4  years).  They  regress  the 
weighted  average  change  of the  m-period  rate  on the 
current  spread  and  get  results  similar  to  those  of 
Fama  and Bliss. Specifically,  they  find that  the  spread 
between  the  4-year  and  l-year  rates  and  the  spread 
between  the  S-year  and  l-year  rates  have  significant 
forecasting  power  for  the  weighted  average  change 
in  the  one-year  rate  over  the  next  3  or  4  years. 
ii  In  a related  paper  Simon  [ 19901 tests  the  forecasting  power 
of the  spread  between  the  three-month  Treasury  bill  rate  and 
the  overnight  federal  funds  rate  for the  average  funds  rate  over 
the  following  three  months.  His  full sample  covers  the  period 
from  1972 to  1987, and  his three  subperiods  correspond  to those 
in  Hardouvelis’s  paper.  Simon  [p.  574,  Table  III finds  that  the 
spread  has  forecasting  power  in  the  latter  two  subperiods  but 
not  in  the  1970s. 
Table  III 
FORECASTING  POWER  OF YIELD  CURVE 
FROM  ONE  TO FIVE  YEARS* 
r(l:f+n-1)  -  rl  =  a  +  b[f(n,n-1)  -  rll  +  u:t+n-1 
Dependent  Variable  a  b  R2  -  - 
r(l:t+  1)  -  rl  0.15  0.38  0.02. 
(0.25)  (0.27) 
r(l:t+2)  -  rl  0.25  0.73  0.08 
(0.55)  (0.52) 
r(l:t+3)  -  rl  0.17  1.28  0.23 
(0.55)  (0.31) 
r(l:t+4)  -  rl  0.10  1.53  0.29 
(0.51)  (0.33) 
l  Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  Interest  rates  are  continuously  com- 
pounded  annual  rates  in  percentage  points.  “n”  refers  to  maturity  in years. 
Estimation  period  is  1952:l  to  1983:2. 
III. 
EVIDENCEOFAVARIABLETERMPREMIUM 
The  studies  surveyed  in  the  previous  section 
strongly  reject  the  expectations  theory,  especially 
when  the  theory  is tested  with  the  standard  regres- 
sion  using  three-  and  six-month  or  six- and  twelve- 
month  rates.  The  rejection  of the  theory  implies  that 
either  (1) the  term  premium  is not  constant,  (2) the 
rational  expectations  assumption  is  not  valid,  or 
(3) both.  We  discuss  evidence  regarding  the  variable 
term  premium  in this  section  and evidence  regarding 
the  rational  expectations  assumption  in  the  follow- 
ing  section. 
Most  explanations  of the  lack  of empirical  support 
for  the  expectations  theory  have  focused  on  the 
possibility  that  the  expected  term  premium  is  not 
constant,  as  assumed  by  the  theory,  but  varies 
substantially  over  time.  If  the  term  premium  is 
variable,  the  estimate  of  b  in  equation  (10)  will 
differ from  the  value  of one  predicted  by the  expec- 
tations  theory.  A number  of papers  have  discussed 
the  determinants  of  the  estimated  coefficient  and 
derived  expressions  for  the  probability  limit  of the 
coefficient  when  the  variance  of,the  term  premium 
is positive.  (See  Hardouvelis  [  1988,  pp.  342-3431  and 
Mankiw  and  Miron  [ 1986,  pp.  ‘218~2201.)  The 
derivation  of  one  of these  expressions  is  shown  in 
Appendix  II. One  conclusion  of these  papers  is that, 
generally,  the  greater  the  fraction  of the  variance  in 
the  spread  between  the  forward  and  spot  rates  due 
to the  variance  in the  expected  term  premium-and 
the  smaller  the  fraction  due  to  the  variance  of the 
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coefficient  below  the  value  of one  predicted  by  the 
expectations  theory.  ia If the  variance  of the  expected 
change  in  rates  is  equal  to  the  variance  of the  ex- 
pected  term  premium,  then  the  estimate  of  the 
coefficient  converges  to  one-half. 
From  this  perspective  the  relevant  questions  are 
(1)  does  the  expected  term  premium  vary  and  (2) 
how  much  does  it  vary  relative  to  the  expected 
change  in rates.  Evidence  from  a variety  of sources 
suggests  that  the  expected  term  premium  does  vary 
substantially  over  time  and,  moreover,  that  the 
magnitude  of  the  variance  is  comparable  to  the 
variance  in  the  expected  change  in  rates. 
Evidence  from  Holding  Period 
Premium  Regressions 
As discussed  in Section  I, an alternative  and  com- 
piementary  way  to estimate  the  standard  regression 
is to make  the  dependent  variable  the  holding  period 
premium  rather  than  the  expected  change  in rates: 
h(6,3:t  +3)  -  r3  =  al  +  bl[f(6,3)  -  r3] 
+  u:t+3  (14) 
A value  of bl  greater  than  zero  is evidence  that  the 
forward  rate  premium  has  had  forecasting  power 
for the  excess  return  from  holding  six-month  versus 
three-month  securities  over  a three-month  period. 
A value  of bl  equal  to  one  would  be  evidence  that 
virtually  all variation  in the  yield curve  is due  to varia- 
tion  in expected  returns.  (This  conclusion,  of course, 
depends  on  the  rational  expectations  assumption.) 
Fama  [ 19861  estimates  equation  (14)  using  one- 
and  three-month  rates,  three-  and  six-month  rates, 
and  six- and  twelve-month  rates.  He  reports  values 
of  b 1 that  are  close  to  one. for  bills  and  average  a 
little  over  one-half  for  CDs  and  commercial  paper. 
These  results  indicate  that  variation  in the  slope  of 
the  yield curve  provides  systematic  information  about 
expected  excess  returns.  As  Fama  [1984a,  p.  5121 
emphasizes,  this  is evidence  that  the  current  slope 
of  the  money  market  yield  curve  is  influenced  by 
expected  term  premiums  that  change  over  time. 
Evidence  from  Lower  Bound  Estimates 
A few  papers  have  tried  to  measure  the  variance 
of  the  term  premium  by  estimating  interest  rate 
‘2 Specifically,  these  papers  find  that  if the  correlation  coeffi- 
cient  between  the  expected  change  in  rates  and  the  expected 
term  premium  is zero  or greater  than  zero,  the  probability  limit 
of the  estimated  coefficient  in equation  (10)  is a strictly  increas- 
ing function  of the  ratio  of the  variance  of the  expected  change 
in  rates  to  the  variance  of  the  expected  term  premium. 
forecasting  equations  using  data  that  was  available 
to market  participants  at the  time  of their  forecasts. 
Startz  [1982]  regresses  the  current  interest  rate,  r, 
on lagged  values  of spot  and  forward  rates.  He  then 
uses  the  standard  error  of  this  equation  as  a max- 
imum  estimate  or  “upper  bound”  of  the  standard 
deviation  of the  market’s  forecast  error,  assuming  that 
the  set  of variables  used  in the  regression  represents 
a minimum  set of information  available to market  par- 
ticipants  to  forecast  rates. 
Startz  then  decomposes  the  spread  between  the 
forward  rate  and  the  subsequent  matching  spot  rate 
(which  he labels  the  “forward  deviation”)  into  the  ex- 
pected  term  premium  (P)  and  the  forecast  error  (e): 
f-r:t+3  =  (f-Er:t+3)  +  (Er:t+3  -r:t+3) 
=  P  +  e  (15) 
The  variance  of  (f -r:t  +3)  is: 
var(f -r:t  +3)  =  var(P)  +  var(e)  +Zcov(P,e)  (16) 
The  covariance  of P and  e is zero  under  the  rational 
expectations  assumption,  however,  because  P  is 
known  at the  time  of the  forecast  and  should  not  be 
correlated  with  forecast  errors.  Hence, 
var(P)  =  var(f-r:t+3)  -  var(e)  (17) 
From  equation  (17)  we  can  see  that  if v%(e)-the 
standard  error  of the  regression  squared-is  an  up- 
per  bound  estimate  for  the  true  variance  of  the 
market’s  forecast  error,  then  var(f -r:t  +3)  -  v%(e) 
is a lower-  bound  estimate  of the  true  variance  of the 
term  premium. 
Startz  calculates  lower  bound  estimates  over  the 
period  from  1953  through  1971  of  the  proportion 
of  the  variance  of  the  spread  between  the  forward 
rate  for a one-month  bill and  the  subsequent  match- 
ing  spot  rate  that  was  due  to  variation  in  the  term 
premium.  These  estimates  range  from  one-third  to 
two-thirds  over  horizons  from  one  to twelve  months. 
This  conclusion  implies  that  lower  bound  estimates 
of  the  ratio  of  the  variance  of  the  premium  to  the 
variance  of the  forecast  error  ranged  from  one-half 
to two.  Of course,  this  is a lower  bound  estimate  of 
the  ratio  of  the  variance  of  the  premium  to  the 
variance  of the  forecast  error,  not  to the  variance  of 
the  expected  change  in  rates.  Nevertheless,  these 
results  suggest  that  the  variation  in the  premium  is 
substantial.  l3 
13 Moreover,  in  the  interest  rate  survey  data  discussed  in  the 
following  section,  the  variance  of the  expected  change  in rates 
is  less  than  the  variance  of forecast  errors,  in which  case  one- 
half  to  two  would  also  be  a lower  bound  estimate  for  the  ratio 
of the  variance  of the  premium  to  the  variance.of  the  expected 
change  in  rates. 
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the  same procedure  as Startz  to calculate  lower bound 
estimates  over  the  period  from  1970  through  1982 
of the  proportion  of the  variance  of the  spreads  be- 
tween  the  forward  rates  for four- and eight-week  bills 
and the  subsequent  matching  spot  rates  that  was due 
to  variation  in  the  term  premium.  Their  estimates 
range  from  one-fifth  to three-fifths  for horizons  from 




The  previous  section  presented  evidence  that  a 
variable  term  premium  contributes  to  the  rejection 
of the  expectations  hypothesis  in the  tests  reported 
in  Section  II.  The  remaining  question  is  whether 
violation  of the  rational  expectations  assumption  also 
contributes  to  the  regression  results.  A  way  to 
evaluate  this  question  is  to  use  survey  data  to  get 
an estimate  of the  market’s  interest  rate expectations. 
For  instance,  suppose  ESr(3:t  +3)  is  the  mean 
response  from  survey  participants  of  the  expected 
level  of  the  three-month  rate  three  months  in  the 
future.  Then  the  coefficients  of the  standard  equa- 
tion  can  be  estimated  with  the  regression: 
ESr(3:t  +3)-r3  =  a  +  b[f(6,3)  -r3]  +  u  (18) 
The  variables  in  equation  (18)  are  all measured  at 
time  t,  the  time  of  the  survey.  Consequently,  the 
expected  coefficient  estimates  do not  depend  on the 
rational  expectations  assumption.  That  is, if the term 
premium  is constant,  then  the  estimated  coefficient 
of the  forward  rate  premium  in equation  (18)  should 
be  close  to  1  regardless  of  how  expectations  are 
formed. 
A  small  number  of  studies,  including  Friedman 
[ 19791 and Froot  [ 19891, have  used  the “Goldsmith- 
Nagan”  survey  data  to estimate  versions  of equation 
(18).  The  survey  data  are based  on a quarterly  survey 
of 25 to 45  market  participants  on the  interest  rates 
they  expect  three  and  six months  in the  future.  The 
survey  was  originally  conducted  by  the  GO&F&- 
Nagan  Bond  and  Money  Market  Letter  and  is  now 
published  in the  newsletter  Washington Bond &f’Money 
Market  Report.  The  survey  collects  forecasts  of the 
three-month  bill rate,  the  twelve-month  bill rate,  and 
a private  sector  three-month  rate,  along with forecasts 
of a number  of long-term  interest  rates.  Through  the 
March  1978  survey  the  private  rate  was  the  three- 
month  Eurodollar  rate.  Since  then,  the  private  rate 
has  been  the  three-month  commercial  paper  rate. 
There  is  typically  about  a  two-week  period  be- 
tween  the  time  the  survey  forms  are  mailed  to  the 
respondents  and  the  latest  market  close  prior  to 
publication  of the  responses.  The  average  timing  of 
the  latest  close  prior  to  publication  is  the  end  of 
the  quarter,  and  in  estimating  equation  (18)  we 
matched  the  survey  data with  the  end-of-quarter  data 
on Treasury  bill rates  from  McCulloch  and  the  end- 
of-quarter  data  on Eurodollar  and  commercial  paper 
rates  from  Salomon  Brothers.r4  We  also used  the  six- 
and  nine-month  Treasury  bill  rates  from  the 
McCulloch  data to calculate  the  six-month  ahead  for- 
ward  rate for a three-month  bill, f(9,6),  and estimated 
the  coefficients  of an  equation  with  the  survey  ex- 
pected  change  in the three-month  bill rate  six months 
in  the  future  as  the  dependent  variable: 
ESr(3:t+6)  -r3  =  a  +  b[f(9,6)  -r3]  +  u.  (19) 
Equation  (19)  can  not  be  estimated  for private  sec- 
tor  rates  because  Salomon  Brothers  does  not  have 
the  nine-month  rates  needed  to  calculate  f(9,6). 
The  top  part  of  Table  IV  shows  the  regression 
results  for  equations  (18)  and  (19)  using  the 
Goldsmith-Nagan  survey  data.  The  coefficients  of 
the  forward  rate  premium  in  these  regressions  are 
all positive  and  significant.  The  low Durbin-Watson 
statistics,  however,  suggest  that  serial  correlation  is 
a serious  problem,  and  inspection  of the  regression 
residuals  indicated  that  they  fall sharply  in recessions. 
Consequently,  we  reestimated  the  regressions  with 
a dummy  variable  set  equal  to one  for all the  survey 
dates that  occurred  in recessions.r5  The  coefficients 
of  the  forward  rate  premium  in  these  regressions 
range  from  0.45  to  0.59  and  are  significant  at 
the  one  percent  level  in  the  Treasury  bill  rate  and 
r4 On  average  over  the  period  covered  by the  survey  regressions 
the  latest  market  close  prior  to publication  of the  survey  results 
falls  on  the  last  day  of the  quarter.  The  average  absolute  dif- 
ference  between  the  latest  close  and  the  last  day  of the  quarter 
is four days.  We  know  of no reason  to expect  that  the  differences 
between  the  timing  of the  survey  and  the  timing  of the  calcula- 
tion  of the  forward  rate  premium  would  bias  the  estimate  of b 
in  equations  (18)  and  (19).  Froot  [1989,  p.  285,  footnote  91 
experiments  with  data  sets  one  week  and  two  weeks  before  the 
end  of the  quarter  and  finds  that  the  regression  results  are  the 
same  as  with  end-of-quarter  data. 
1s The  dummv  variable  equals  1 from the  fourth  quarter  of 1969 
through  the  third  quarter-of  1970,  the  fourth  quarter  of  1973 
throueh  the  fourth  Quarter of 1974.  and  the  first  auarter  of 1980 
throuih  the  third  quarter  of 1982. ‘The latter  period  covers  two 
recessions  that  are  separated  by  three  quarters. 
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TEST  OF THE  EXPECTATIONS  THEORY  USING  SURVEY  DATA* 
A.  Dependent  Variable:  Survey  Expected  Change  in  Rates 
ESr(m:t  +  n -m)  .  rm  =  a  +  b[f(n,n  -m)  -  rml  +  cD  +  U 
Treasury  Bills 
ESr(3:t+3)  -  r3 
ESr(3:t+3)  -  r3 
ESr(3:t+6)  -  r3 
ESr(3:t+6)  -  r3 
Eurodollars 
ESr(3:t+3)  -  r3 
ESr(3:t+3)  -  r3 
Commercial  Paper 
ESr(3:t+3)  -  r3 
ESr(3:t+3)  -  r3 
a  b 
-0.33  0.44 
(0.11)  (0.14) 
-0.11  0.54 
(0.07)  (0.11) 
-0.43  0.53 
(0.13)  (0.11) 
-0.08  0.50 

















c  - 
-0.96 
(0.10) 






Ra  - 
0.19 





0.70  ‘1.24  69:3-86:2 
0.31  0.59  69:3-86:2 
0.68  1.27  69:3-86:2 
0.42  0.67  69:3-78:  1 
0.56  1.17 
1.35 
2.11 
69:3-78:  1 
0.35  78:2-86:2 
0.58  78:2-86:2 
*  Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.  Interest  rates  are  continuously  compounded  annual  rates  in  percentage  points.  “n”  and  “m”  refer  to  maturity  in  months. 
D  is a dummy  variable  set  equal  to  1 from  the  fourth  quarter  of  1969  through  the  third  quarter  of  1970,  the  fourth  quarter  of  1973  through  the  fourth  quarter 
of  1974,  and  the  first  quarter  of  1980  through  the  third  quarter  of  1982. 
B.  Dependent  Variable:  Actual  Change  in  Rates 
r(m:t+n-m)  -  rm  =  a  +  b[f(n,n-m)  -  rml  +  u:t+m 
a  b  Ra  - 
Treasury  Bills 
r(3:t+3)  -  r3  0.20  -0.35  0.02 
(0.26)  (0.42) 
r(3:t+6)  -  r3  -0.16  0.14  0.00 
(0.35)  (0.24) 
Eurodollars 
r(3:t+3)  -  r3  -0.31  0.62  0.07 
(0.28)  (0.36) 
Commercial  Paper 
r(3:t+3)  -  r3  -0.04  0.23  0.00 
(0.42)  (0.82) 
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69:3-78:  1 
78:2-86:2 commercial  paper  rate  regressions.i6  The  coefficients 
of the  dummy  variable  are  all negative  and  signifi- 
cantly  different  from  zero.  Moreover,  the  Durbin- 
Watson  statistics  for  these  regressions  rise  sharply, 
although  they  still indicate  some  serial  correlation  in 
three  of  the  four  regressions.  A  plausible  explana- 
tion  for  the  significance  of  the  dummy  variable 
coefficient  is that  the  term  premium  rises  in reces- 
sions.  We  discuss  this  possibility  in  Section  VI. 
For  comparison  with  the  survey  regression  results, 
the  bottom  part  of Table  IV shows  estimates  of the 
regressions  over  the  same  sample  period  and  the 
same  quarterly  observations  but  with  the  actual 
change  in  rates  as  the  dependent  variable.  The 
negligible  explanatory  power  of these  regressions  is 
in  sharp  contrast  to  the  survey  regressions. 
We  can  derive  an  estimate  of the  term  premium 
implied  by  the  survey  results  by  subtracting  the 
expected  change  in  rates  from  the  forward  rate 
premium  at  the  time  of  the  survey.  This  estimate 
can  be  used  to  calculate  an  estimate  of the  relative 
magnitude  of the  variances  of the  premium  and  the 
expected  change  in rates.  These  variances  are  sum- 
marized  in Table  V for both  Treasury  bills and private 
securities  at the  three-month  forecast  horizon.  The 
ratio  of the  variance  of the  premium  to the  variance 
of the  expected  change  in rates  is  1.11  for bills  and 
about  0.65  for  private  securities.  These  numbers 
appear  roughly  consistent  with the  evidence  from the 
studies  reviewed  in Section  III that  used  forecasting 
equations  to generate  lower  bound  estimates  of the 
variance  of  the  premium. 
The  survey  regression  results  suggest  that  the 
rational  expectations  assumption  used  in the  studies 
surveyed  in Section  II is not valid for the  time  period 
covered  by  the  survey  data.  To  see  this,  note  that 
the  actual  change  in  the  three-month  rate  used  as 
the  dependent  variable  in  these  studies  can  be 
decomposed  into the expected  change  in the rate plus 
a forecast  error.  If the  actual  change  in interest  rates 
r6 Froot  [ 1989,  ~293,  Table  III] reports  estimates  of equations 
for the  three-month  ahead  expected  changes  in the  three-month 
bill  ,rate,  the  twelve-month  bill  rate,  and  the  three-month 
Eurodollar  rate,  and  six-month  ahead  expected  changes  in  the 
three-month  bill  rate  and  the  twelve-month  bill  rate.  He  also 
finds  a strong  positive  correlation  between  forward  rate premiums 
and  the  survey  expectations.  The  major  difference  between  his 
results  and  those  reported  here  is that  he reports  a negative  coef- 
ficient of  -0.05  in the  regression  for the  six-month  ahead  forecast 
of the  change  in the  three-month  bill rate.  Hamburger  and  Platt 
11975. o.  191. footnote  51 find  the  correlation  between  forward 
rates  and  the  survey’s  expected  rates  to  be  so  strong  that  they 
cite  it as  evidence  that  forward  rates  are  the  market’s  expecta- 
tions  of future  spot  rates. 
Table  V 
VARIANCE  OF  SURVEY  EXPECTED  CHANGE 
IN  RATES  AND  SURVEY  PREMIUM 
Treasury  Bills  (69:3-86:2) 
Variance  of  Premium 
Variance  of  Expected  Change  in  Rates 
Ratio  =  1.11 
0.42 
0.38 
Eurodollars  f69:3-78:l) 
Variance  of  Premium 
Variance  of  Expected  Change  in  Rates 
Ratio  =  0.63 
0.29 
0.46 
Commerciai  Paper  (78:2-86~2) 
Variance  of  Premium 
Variance  of  Expected  Change  in  Rates 
Ratio  =  0.66 
0.41 
0.62 
is  uncorrelated  with  the  forward  rate  premium- 
as  indicated  by  the  regression  results  reported  in 
Section  II-but  the  expected  change  is  positively 
correlated  with  the  forward  rate  premium,  then  the 
survey  forecast  error  must  be  negatively  correlated 
with  the  forward  rate  premium.  This  is a violation 
of the  rational  expectations  assumption  specified  by 
equation  (9). 
As  shown  in Appendix  II,  a negative  correlation 
between  forecast  errors  and the forward  rate premium 
reduces  the  coefficient  of the  forward  rate  premium 
in tests  of the  expectations  theory  (estimated  with 
actual changes  in rates)  below  the value of 1 predicted 
by the  theory.  Following  Froot  [ 1989,  pp.  290-94, 
we  can  use  the  survey  data  to  get  estimates  of the 
effects  of  the  variable  term  premium  and  forecast 
errors  on the  coefficient  of the  forward  rate premium. 
The  probability  limit of the  coefficient  of the  forward 
rate  premium  can  be  written  as  one  minus  a  devi- 
ation  due  to the  variable  term  premium  plus  a devi- 
ation  due  to  systematic  expectational  errors: 
where  FP  refers to the forward  rate premium,  8 refers 
to  the  term  premium,  and  e refers  to  expectational 
errors.  The  survey  data  can  be  used  to  derive 
estimates  of the  terms  on the  right-hand  side of equa- 
tion  (20).  According  to  these  estimates,  shown  in 
Table  VI,  roughly  half the  deviation  from  1  .O of the 
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Regression  Attributable  to 
Component 
Attributable  to 
Horizon  Coefficient  Term  Premium  Forecast  Errors 
3-Month 
Treasury  Bill 
3  Months  -0.35  0.56  -0.79 
3-Month 
Treasury  Bill 
6  Months  0.14  0.47  -0.39 
3-Month 
Eurodollar 




3  Months  0.23  0.10  -0.67 
*  The  construction  of  this  table  follows  Froot  f1989,  p.  291,  Table  III. The  regression  coefficients  are  from  Part  B  of 
Table  IV.  Columns  (2)  and  (3)  are  calculated  using  the  Goldsmith-Nagan  survey  data  from  the  third  quarter  of  1969 
through  the  second  quarter  of  1986.  Column  (1)  equals  1.0  minus  column  (2)  plus  column  (3). 
Table  VI 
coefficient  of the  forward  rate  premium  is due  to  a 
variable  term  premium  and half results  from  the  cor- 
relation  of  forecast  errors  with  the  forward  rate 
premium. 
The  survey  regression  results  suggest  that  market 
participants  build  their  expectations  into  the  yield 
curve,  but  their  forecasts  have  been  so poor  at  the 
three-  and  six-month  horizons  that  the  yield  curve 
has  had  negligible  forecasting  power  for  the  subse- 
quent  three-month  and  six-month  rates. l7 Of course, 
this interpretation  depends  critically  on the  assump- 
tion  that  the  mean  of  the  survey  forecasts  is  an 
unbiased  estimate  of  the  market  forecast,  and  that 
the  survey  expectations  can  be  interpreted  as deter- 
mining the  current  slope  of the  yield  curve.  One  can 
imagine  circumstances  under  which  this  might  not 
be  true.  For  example,  the  forecasters  used  in  the 
survey  might  be  influenced  by  the  current  shape  of 
the  yield  curve  in  determining  their  interest  rate 
forecasts,  in which  case  the  regression  results  would 
be  spurious.  Or  they  might  systematically  differ  in 
I7 The  poor  forecasting  of market  participants  at the  three-  and 
six-month  horizons  is documented  by  Hafer  and  Hein  11989, 
p. 37,  Table  11, who  evaluate  the  forecasting  power  of both  the 
Goldsmith-Nagan  survey  data  and  the  Treasury  bill  futures 
market.  They  find that  naive forecasts  of no change  in the  three- 
month  bill rate  over  the  following  three  and  six months  do about 
as well as the  changes  forecast  by the  Goldsmith-Nagan  survey 
or by the  futures  market.  Similarly,  Belongia  [1987,  p.  13, Table 
l]  finds  that  a forecast  of no  change  in  rates  over  six  months 
does  as well  as the  consensus  forecast  of a group  of economists 
surveyed  regularly  by  the  Wal/  Streer Journal. 
their  forecasts  from  the  market  in general  for  other 
reasons,  perhaps  because  their  forecasts  are  made 
public  or  because  they  are  not  actively  involved  in 
buying  and  selling  securities.ra  We  know  of no  evi- 
dence  that  either  of  these  possibilities  is true.19 
A final point  to make  here  is that  there  is a distinc- 
tion  between  the  specialized  form  of  the  rational 
expectations  hypothesis  used  in  the  literature 
surveyed  in this article-indicated  by equation  (9)- 
and  the  general  principle  of  rational  expectations, 
which  is that  market  participants  use  available  infor- 
mation  efficiently in forming their expectations.  Webb 
119873  discusses  a number  of reasons  why  rational 
market  participants  might  not  behave  over  a given 
time  period  according  to the  specialized  form  of the 
hypothesis.  A general  point  is that  it  is difficult  to 
say  anything  definite  about  whether  market  partici- 
pants  have  formed  expectations  rationally  without  a 
clear  understanding  of  the  process  determining 
interest  rate  movements. 
r* Kane  [ 1983,  pp.  117-l  181 emphasizes  that  survey  respondents 
should  be decision-makers  with  the  authority  and  willingness  to 
commit  funds  in  support  of  their  forecasts.  He  finds  [p.  1191 
that  in his survey  the  response  of “bosses”  (i.e.,  decision-makers) 
differs from the  response  of non-bosses.  Many  of the respondents 
in  the  Goldsmith-Nagan  survey  are  senior  officials  in  their 
respective  organizations  and  would  seem  to  fit  the  label  of 
“decision-maker.”  We  are  not  aware,  however,  of any  general 
classification  of the  Goldsmith-Nagan  respondents  along  these 
lines. 
19  More  detailed  discussions  and  evaluations  of the  Goldsmith- 
Nagan  survey  data  are  found  in  Prell  119733, Throop  [1981], 
Friedman  119801,  and  Hafer  and  Hein  [1989]. 
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the  Goldsmith-Nagan  forecasts  over  the  period  from 
late  1979  through  mid-1982.  In  reaction  to  rising 
inflation,  the  Federal  Reserve  at the  beginning  of the 
period  unexpectedly  raised  short-term  interest  rates 
sharply  and then  kept  them  at an unusually  high level 
for most  of the  following  2 ‘/2  years.  The  Fed’s policy 
over  this  period  was  generally  not  anticipated  by 
market  participants.  As a result,  following  the  initial 
increase  in  rates  the  survey  participants  forecasted 
large  declines  in rates  for  several  quarters  in a row. 
(See  Chart  1  in  the  following  section.)  It  seems 
reasonable  that  in  this  episode  the  expectations  of 
market  participants  at  the  three-  and  six-month 
horizons  would  be  influenced  by their judgment  that 
monetary  policy  actions  had  driven  short-term  rates 
to a level  that  could  not  be sustained.  Moreover,  the 
expectation  that  rates  were  going  to  fall  sharply 
eventually  proved  correct.  Yet ex post  the  expected 
declines  in rates  at the  three-  and six-month  horizons 
over  this period  were  accompanied  by large  positive 
forecast  errors.  This  contributed  to  a negative  cor- 
relation  over  the  estimation  period  between  the  ex- 
pected  change  in  rates  and  forecast  errors,  but  it 
does  not  seem  accurate  to  say  that  market  partici- 
pants  formed  expectations  irrationally  over  this 
period. 
V. 
FEDERAL  FUNDS RATE EXPECTATIONS  AND 
The  regression  results  reported  in Section  II indi- 
cate  that  the  slope  of the  yield  curve  from  three  to 
twelve  months  has  had  no  forecasting  power  for 
three-  and  six-month  rates.  A puzzling  aspect  of the 
strong  rejection  of the  expectations  theory  from  this 
type  of test  is that  it  seems  at  odds  with  the  stan- 
dard  view  among  money  market  participants  that 
money  market’rates  are  largely  determined  by  the 
current  and expected  levels  of the  shortest-term  rate, 
the  federal  funds  rate.  A second  puzzling  aspect  of 
the  regression  results  is that  the yield  curve  from one 
week  to three  months  and from one year to five years 
has  had  forecasting  power,  even  though  the  yield 
curve  from  three  to  twelve  months  has  had  no 
forecasting  power.  This  section  discusses  possible 
explanations  for  these  two  puzzles. 
Federal  Funds  Rate  Expectations  and 
the  Mankiw-Miron  Hypothesis 
Market  participants  view  the  federal  funds  rate  as 
the  instrument  used  by the  Federal  Reserve  to carry 
out  its  policy  decisions.  In  forming  expectations  of 
the  future  level  of  the  funds  rate  they  attempt  to 
identify  Federal  Reserve  actions  signaling  changes 
in  the  funds  rate  target,  and  they  attempt  to  fore- 
cast  values  of macroeconomic  variables  they  believe 
influence  the  Fed’s  decisions.*O  Many  studies  over 
the  past  decade  have  found  that  Treasury  bill rates 
respond  to  monetary  policy  announcements  or  ac- 
tions  that  influence  funds  rate expectations.  Similarly, 
many  studies  have  found  that  bill  rates  respond  to 
incoming  news  on  variables-such  as  the  money 
supply-that  market  participants  believe  are  likely 
to  influence  policy  actions.  If money  market  rates 
are  so sensitive  to funds  rate  expectations,  as these 
studies  suggest,  why  do  tests  of  the  expectations 
theory  using  rates  from  three  to  twelve  months  fail 
so  badly? 
A possible  answer  focuses  on the  way market  par- 
ticipants  form  expectations  of the  future  behavior  of 
the  federal  funds  rate.  Mankiw  and  Miron  [ 1986,  p. 
22.5] suggest  that  at each  point  in time  the  Federal 
Reserve  sets  the  short  rate  (i.e.,  the  federal  funds 
rate)  at a level  that  it expects  to  maintain  given  the 
information  affecting  its  policy  decisions.  They 
hypothesize  that  market  participants  understand  this 
behavior  and  therefore  expect  changes in  the  short 
rate  at  any  point  in  time  to  be  zero:  “Under  this 
characterization  of policy,  while the Fed  might  change 
the  short  rate  in  response  to  new  information,  it 
always (rationally)  expected  to maintain  the  short  rate 
at its current  level.”  If this  view  is correct,  then  the 
whole  spectrum  of  money  market  rates  would 
adjust  up  and  down  in  response  to  changes  in  the 
funds  rate  targeted  by  the  Fed,  but  the  dope  of the 
yield  curve  would  be  unchanged.  Hence,  expected 
changes  in interest  rates  would  be negligible,  and the 
variance  of expected  changes  in rates  would  be small. 
This  expectations  behavior  coupled  with  a variable 
term  premium  could  explain  the  regression  results 
in Section  II.  The  paradox  according  to  this  expla- 
nation  is that  tests  of the  expectations  theory  using 
three-  and  six-month  rates  provide  little  support 
for the  theory,  even  though  rates  at these  maturities 
are,  in  fact,  responding  strongly  to  funds  rate 
expectations. 
Mankiw  and  Miron  provide  support  for this  argu- 
ment  by testing  the  expectations  theory  using  three- 
and  six-month  interest  rates  over  the  Z-year  period 
prior to the founding  of the  Fed  and over four periods 
z” See  McCarthy  119873 for  a  description  of  “Fed-watching” 
behavior  bv  market  oarticioants  and  Goodfriend  119901 for  a 
description’  of  the  Gederai  Reserve’s  interest  rate  targeting 
procedures. 
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tations  theory  in  any  of  the  latter  periods.  In  the 
period  prior  to  the  founding  of  the  Fed,  however, 
they  find that  the yield curve from three  to six months 
had  substantial  forecasting  power  and  that  the  slope 
coefficient  for this time  period  is only modestly  below 
the  value  predicted  by  the  expectations  theory. 
Mankiw  and  Miron  also  present  evidence  that  after 
the  founding  of the  Fed  there  was  a sharp  deterior- 
ation  in  the  ability  of time  series  forecasting  equa- 
tions  to  forecast  changes  in  interest  rates  three 
months  in the  future.  In  light  of this  evidence  they 
conclude  that  the  ability  of  market  participants  to 
forecast  changes  in short-term  rates  fell sharply  after 
the  founding  of the  Fed,  resulting  in a sharp  rise  in 
the  ratio  of  the  variance  of  the  premium  to  the 
variance  of  the  expected  change  in  interest  rates. 
Cook  and Hahn  11989, p.  345)  catalogue  the  reac- 
tions  of  the  three.-month,  six-month,  and  twelve- 
month  Treasury  bill rates  to events  changing  federal 
funds  rate  expectations  and  find  these  reactions  to 
be  broadly  consistent  with  the  Mankiw-Miron 
hypothesis.  These  reactions  are  summarized  in 
Table  VII,  which  shows  the  estimated  coefficients 
of  regression  equations  of  the  form: 
ARTBi  =  a  +  bAXj  +  u,  (21) 
Where  ARTBi  is the  change  in the  Treasury  bill rate 
at  matuiity  i and  AXj  is  the  change  in  a variable  j 
that  influences  the  market’s  funds  rate  expectations. 
The  top  of the  table  shows  the  reaction  of bill rates 
to  changes  in the  Federal  funds  rate  target  over  the 
period  from  September  1974  to  September  1979.21 
The  middle  shows  the  reaction  of bill  rates  to  dis- 
count  rate  announcements  with  policy  content  in the 
1973-1985  period  (i.e.,  announcements  indicating 
the  discount  rate  is being  changed  for reasons  other 
than  to  simply  realign  it with  market  rates).Z2  The 
bottom  of the  table  shows  the  reaction  of bill rates 
to  announcements  of  unexpected  changes  in  the 
money  supply.  Under  the  “policy  anticipations 
hypothesis”-which  is  the  most  widely  accepted 
explanation  for  this  phenomenon-this  reaction 
occurs  because  the  Fed  is expected  to raise  or lower 
the  funds  rate  .in response  to  deviations  of  money 
from  its  target  path. 
z1 This  period  is unique  in that  the  Fed  controlled  the  funds  rate 
so  closely  that  market  participants  could  identify  most  changes 
in the  funds  rate  target  on  the  day  they  were  first  implemented 
by  the  Fed.  See  Cook  and  Hahn  (1989,  pp.  332-3381. 
z2 Cook  and  Hahn  119881 find  that  throughout  this  period  the 
Fed  systematically  used  discount  rate  announcements  with  policy 
content  to  signal  persistent  changes  in  the  federal  funds  rate. 
A striking  aspect  of the  regression  coefficients  in 
Table  VII  is  the  relative  stability  from  the  three- 
month  through  the  twelve-month  maturities.  This 
suggests  that  new  information  influencing  expecta- 
tions  of  the  future  level  of  the  funds  rate-even 
though  it  has  a  strong  effect  on  bill  rates  at  all 
maturities-has  little  effect  on  the  slope  of  the 
Treasury  yield  curve  from  three  to  twelve  months. 
In  light  of this  evidence  it seems  plausible  that  the 
variance  of the  yield  curve  over  this  range  has  been 
dominated  by  movement  in  the  term  premium,  as 
suggested  by  Mankiw  and  Miron. 
A  More  General  Monetary  Policy 
Explanation  for  the  Regression  Results 
While  the  Mankiw-Miron  hypothesis  can  help 
explain  the  absence  of forecasting  power  of the  yield 
curve  from  three  to twelve  months,  it is inconsistent 
with  the  evidence  that  the  yield  curve  up  to  three 
months  and from one to five years  has had forecasting 
power.  One  can  pose  a more  general  version  of the 
monetary  policy  explanation  that  is consistent  with 
this  evidence,  and,  we believe,  mdre  in line with  the 
way  market  participants  actually  view  monetary 
policy. 
The  Mankiw-Miron  hypothesis  assumes  that  the 
Fed  reacts  continuously  to new  information  affecting 
its  policy  decisions,  whereas  in practice  Fed  policy 
changes  are  of  a  more  discontinuous  nature.  That 
is,  changes  in  the  Fed’s  target  for  the  funds  rate 
typically  occur  infrequently  after  they  are  triggered 
by  the  cumulative  weight  of ‘new  information  on 
economic  activity  and  inflation.  Consequently,  at 
times  there  is  a  gap  between  the  release  of  new 
information  influencing  policy  expectations  and when 
policy  actually  changes.  This  information  could  take 
the  form  of a policy  announcement-such  as  a dis- 
count  rate  announcement-which  signals  an upcom- 
ing change  in the  funds  rate  target.  Or  it could  take 
the  form  of news  on  an economic  variable-such  as 
the  money  supply  or  employment-that  is  viewed 
by market  participants  as likely to influence  the  Fed’s 
target  for  the  funds  rate. 
If policy  and  news  announcements  affect  expec- 
tations  of changes  in the  funds  rate  over  a relatively 
short  term,  then  the  slope  of the  bill yield  curve  out 
to three  months  will vary  more  in response  to chang- 
ing interest  rate  expectations  than  will the  slope  from 
three  to  twelve  months.  In this  case  the  reaction  of 
market  participants  to  such  announcements  c6uld 
generate  a pattern  of funds  rate  expectations  that  is 
consistent  with  the  regression  results.  For  example, 
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THE  REACTION  OF TREASURY  BILL  RATES  BY MATURITY  TO 
EVENTS  CHANGING  FEDERAL  FUNDS  RATE  EXPECTATIONS* 
(Coefficients  of  Treasury  Bill  Rate  Regressions) 
Federal  funds  rate  target  changes: 
Sept.  1974-Oct.  1979 
Discount  rate  announcements: 
Jan.  1973-O&.  1979 
Oct.  1979-Dec.  1985 
Money  announcements: 
Sept.  1977-O&.  1979 
Oct.  1979-O&  1982 








0.072  0.072 









6-month  12-month 
0.541  0.500 
(10.25)  (9.61) 
0.32  0.30 
(3.54)  (3.15) 
0.61  0.59 
(7.61)  (7.54) 
*  The  funds  rate  target  regression  coefficients  and  the  discount  rate  announcement  regression  coefficients  are  from 
Cook  and  Hahn  [1988.  19891. The  monev  announcement  regression  coefficients  are  from  Gavin  and  Karamouzis  f19841. 
t-statistics  are  in  par&the&.  . 
suppose  a discount  rate  announcement  generates  ex- 
pectations  of  a 50  basis  point  change  in the  funds 
rate the following week,  after which no further  change 
in  the  rate  is  expected.  Under  the  expectations 
theory  the  effect  on  the  slope  of the  yield  curve  out 
to  one  or  two  months  would  be  considerable,  but 
the  effect  on the  slope  from  three  to six months  and 
six  to  twelve  months  would  be  negligible. 
Hegde  and  McDonald  [ 19863 find  that  Treasury 
bill futures  rates  have  substantially  outperformed  a 
no-change  forecast  from  one  to  four  weeks  prior  to 
delivery,  even  though  they  have  not  been  superior 
to  a no-change  forecast  from  five to  thirteen  weeks 
prior  to  delivery.  This  evidence  is consistent  with 
the  hypothesis  that  market  participants  are  at times 
able to forecast  rate  changes  over  the  near-term  and 
build  these  expectations  into  the  yield  curve. 
A  second  modification  one  could  make  to  the 
Mankiw-Miron  hypothesis  notes  that funds rate target 
changes  are  persistent  (i.e.,  not  quickly  reversed) 
but  not  permanent.  23 If  so-and  if market  partici- 
pants  expected  this  type  of  funds  rate  behavior- 
then  increases  in  the  funds  rate  target  would  be 
associated  with  decreases  in the  slope  of the  yield 
curve  between  short-term  rates  and  rates  on  longer 
maturities  of five  to  ten  years,  and  changes  in this 
slope  would  have  some  forecasting  accuracy. 
A number  of recent  papers  have  suggested  that  the 
forecasting  power  of the  spread  between  long-  and 
short-term  rates  is at  least  partially  a  reflection  of 
monetary  policy.  (See  Bernanke  and Blinder  [ 19891, 
Laurent  [ 19893,  and  Stock  and  Watson  [ 1990,  pp. 
2.5261.)  The  basic reasoning  is that  monetary  policy 
has a strong  influence  over  short-term  rates  but  that 
23 Fama  and  Bliss  [ 19871 find  that  the  one-year  Treasury  rate 
is  highly  autocorrelated  but  slowly  mean-reverting,  which  is 
consistent  with the  view that  changes  in the  funds  rate  are highly 
persistent  but  not  permanent. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  17 this influence  diminishes  at longer  maturities.  Hence, 
if short-term  rates  are high  relative  to long-term  rates 
that  is an indication  that  monetary  policy  is contrac- 
tionary  and  a decline  in  inflation  and  interest  rates 
is  likely  in  the  future. 
This  explanation  for the  forecasting  power  of the 
yield curve  between  long- and short-term  rates  seems 
especially  relevant  for the  periods  from  late  1969  to 
late  1970,  mid-1973  to  mid-1974,  and  late  1979  to 
mid-1982.  Near  the  beginning  of  each  of  these 
periods,  the  Fed  raised  the funds  rate  sharply  because 
of its concern  over  accelerating  inflation,  and  short- 
term  rates  rose  well  above  long-term  rates.  (See 
Laurent  (1989,  Figure  2, p.  261.) In each  period  the 
rise in the  funds  rate  and the  downward-sloping  yield 
curve  were  eventually  followed  by  a recession  and 
falling  interest  rates. 24 As  illustrated  in  Chart  1, 
the  Goldsmith-Nagan  survey  participants  expected 
large  declines  in  the  funds  rate  throughout  these 
periods.25  These  expectations  had  considerable 
accuracy  at longer  horizons  of two to four years,  even 
though  they  were  not  very  accurate  at the  three-  and 
six-month  horizons.z6 
If  the  above  adjustments  to  the  Mankiw-Miron 
hypothesis  are correct,  then  one  would  expect  to see 
the  slope  of the  yield  curve  out  to three  months  and 
the  slope  from  one  to five years  vary  more  than  the 
slope  from  three  to  twelve  months  in  response  to 
policy  actions  or  announcements  signaling  changes 
in  the  funds  rate.27  Numerous  studies  have  pro- 
vided  evidence  that  the  response  of interest  rates  to 
24 For  more  discussion  of these  episodes  see  Romer  and  Romer 
[ 19893, who  also  suggest  that  the  sharp  rise  in interest  rates  in 
these  periods  resulted  from  monetary  policy  actions  intended 
to  lower  the  rate  of  inflation., 
2s The  funds  rate  used  in Chart  1 is the  average  rate for the  week 
at the  end  of the  quarter,  as determined  by the  weekly  rate  that 
had  the  greatest  overlap  with  the  last  five  trading  days  of  the 
quarter.  Special  factors  at the  end  of  1985 and  1986 caused  the 
year-end  weekly  average  rate  to rise  sharply  above  its level  over 
the  surrounding  weeks.  In  these  two  cases  Chart  1 uses  the 
average  rate  for  the  previous  week. 
26 Of course,  the  evidence  from  the  survey  data  that  market  par- 
ticipants  expected  large  declines  in interest  rates  three  and  six 
months  in  the  future  in these  episodes  is inconsistent  with  the 
Mankiw-Miron  hypothesis  that  market  participants  always 
forecast  small  changes  in  rates  at  the  three-  and  six-month 
horizons.  These  episodes  constitute  a  relatively  small  part  of 
the  period  covered  by  the  survey  data,  however,  and  they  may 
be  unique  to  this  era.  It  may  be  that  over  the  longer  period 
studied  by Mankiw  and  Miron  the  generalization  that  expected 
changes  in  interest  rates  at  the  three-  and  six-month  horizons 
were  generally  small  is  an  accurate  one. 
27  In the  case  of a&&changes  in the  funds  rate  target,  however, 
one  would  expect  very  short  maturity  rates  to  vary  as  much  as 
three-  and  six-month  rates,  since  in  this  case  the  level  of  the 
funds  rate  rises  immediately. 
Chart  1 
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policy  actions  and  announcements  influencing  policy 
expectations  gradually  declines  at maturities  greater 
than  a year.  For  example,  Cook  and  Hahn  [1989] 
find  that  the  reaction  of Treasury  rates  to funds  rate 
target  changes  falls from 0.50  at the  one-year  maturity 
to 0.29  at the  five-year  maturity  and  0.13  at the  ten- 
year  maturity.  Likewise,  several  papers  including 
Hardouvelis  (19841  and  Gavin  and  Karamouzis 
[ 1984)  have  reported  that  the  reaction  of Treasury 
rates  to  money  announcements  declines  at  longer 
maturities. 
The  evidence  at the  short-end  of the  yield  curve 
is more  limited  and somewhat  more  ambiguous.  The 
reaction  of interest  rates  to  money  announcements 
has  been  studied  by  many  authors,  but  only  a few 
have  looked  at  the  reaction  of  rates  with  shorter 
maturities  than  three  months.  These  studies  have 
found  that  the  reaction  of  the  one-month  rate  to 
money  announcements  is smaller  than  the  reaction 
of  longer-term  money  market  rates,  which  is  con- 
sistent  with  the  notion  that  the  yield  curve  out  to 
three  months  varies  more  in  response  to  changing 
policy  anticipations  than  the  curve  from three  months 
to  a year.  Husted  and  Kitchen  [1985,  p.  4601  find 
that  the  reaction  of  Eurodollar  rates  to  announce- 
ments  of unexpected  increases  in the money  supply- 
as  determined  by  the  coefficients  of  a  regression 
similar to equation  (2 1) above-rose  from  0.28  at the 
one-month  maturity  to  0.46  at  the  three-month 
maturity  and  0.44  at  the  six-month  maturity.  Har- 
douvelis  [ 19841  finds  that  the  reaction  of the  one- 
month  bill rate  (0.24)  was  smaller  than  the  reaction 
of  the  one-  to  two-month  forward  rate  (0.45),  the 
18  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1990 two-  to  three-month  forward  rate  (0.40)  and  the 
three-  to  six-month  forward  rate  (0.35).  (The 
sample  period  for  the  studies  cited  in  this  and  the 
following  paragraph  is from  late  1979  or early  1980 
to  late  1982.). 
Surprisingly,  hotiever,  the  money  announcement 
literature  indicates  that  the  reaction  of the  one-day 
funds  rate  and  the  one-week  bill ‘rate  to  money 
announcements  is’not  smaller  than  the  reaction  of 
longer-term  money  market  rates.  Hardouvelis  finds 
a coefficient  of 0.38  for the  one-day  funds  rate,  and 
Roley  and  Walsh  [ 19851  find .a coefficient  of  0.43 
for’ the  one-day  funds.  rate,  0.37  for  the  one-week 
bill  rate,  and  0.36  for  the  three-month  bill  rate.  A 
possible  explanation  for the  relatively  large  response 
of the  one-day  and  one-week  rates  is that  under  the 
lagged  reserve  accounting  system  prevailing  prior  to 
February  1984  the  weekly  money  announcement 
provided  information  on the current.statement  week’s 
aggregate  demand  for  reserves  that  influenced  the 
expected  average  funds  rate  for  the  statement 
week-and,  hence,  the  one-week  bill  rate- 
independent  of  any  policy  anticipations  effect.28 
VI. 
BFHAVIOR OF ;I‘HE  TERM PREMIUM 
The  evidence  presented  in Section  III suggests  that 
a variable  term  premium  plays  an  important  role  in 
explaining  the  negligible  forecasting  power  of ‘the 
yield  curve  from  three  to twelve  months.  This  con- 
clusion  raises  a final set  of questions.  First,  how  does 
the  term  premium  behave  on average  and at different 
maturities?  Second,  what  causes  the  term  premium 
to’ change  over  time?  The  literature  in  this  area- 
especially  regarding  .the  second  question-is 
voluminous,  yet  largely  inconclusive.  Our  purpose 
here  is  simply  to  provide  a  brief  review  of  this 
literature  and  the  difficulties  researchers  have  faced 
in  trying  to  measure  the  term  premium.. 
The  Average.  Term  Premium  in the 
Money  Market 
Researchers  have  generally  estimated  the  average 
term  premium  in the  money  market  .by calculating 
over  long  periods  of time  the  average  excess  returns 
from  holding  n-month  securities  for  m  months  ver- 
sus the  return  from holding  m-month  securities.  The 
28  Along  these  lines,  Strongin  and  Tarhan  [1990,  pp.  151-1521 
conclude  that  “The  response  of the  Fed  funds  rate  [to money 
announcements]  cannot  be,explained  by either  [policy anticipa- 
tions  or.expected  inflation],  but  instead  by  the  peculiar  way 
money  shocks  are transmitted  to the  reserve  market  under  lagged 
reserves  accounting.” 
most  common  practice  is to use  the  one-month  rate 
for the,benchmark  (m = 1). The  literature  in this area 
has  found  ,a positive  average  term  premium  in  the 
Treasury  bill  market  at  all. maturities.  The  average 
term  premium  rises  sharply  for  the  first .couple  of 
months,  increases  at a decreasing  rate  out  to around 
five  or  six  months,,  and  then  flattens  out.  This 
behavior  is  illustrated  in  Chart  2  which  shows 
estimates  of  the  average.  premium  at  different 
maturities  using  the  McCulloch  data.29 McCulloch 
[ 19871 shows. that  the  CRSP  data  provide  a similar 
picture.  of  the  relationship  between  the  average 
premium  and  maturity  in  the  bill  market.30  Re- 
searchers  have.found  no evidence  of a significant term 
premium,  on  average,  in  the  markets  for  private 
money  market  securities  such  as commercial  paper, 
CDs,  and  Eurodollar-  CDs.  Fama  [ 1986;  p.  ,178, 
Table  11;  for  example,  finds  that-  average  term 
29 For  maturities  up  to  six months,  the  estimate  of the  average 
term  premium  in Chart  2 is the  average  of the  annualized.returns 
earned  by  holding  a Treasury  bill  at  a given  maturity  for  one 
month  less  the  returns  on  a one-month  bill.  For  maturities  of 
nine  and  twelve  months,  the  estimate  of the  average  premium 
is the  average  return  from  holding  a nine-  or twelve-month  bill 
for  three  months  less  the  return  on  a one-month  bill.  (In  the 
latter  two  cases  three  months  is the  shortest  holding  period  yield 
that  can  be  calculated  .using  the  McCulloch  data.), 
30 Fama  (1984bl  provides  evidence  using  the.CRSI?  data.that 
the  premium’declines  between  nine  and  ten  months;  McCulloch 
[ 19871, however,  shows  that  this  evidence  results  from the’small 
bid-ask  spread  on nine-month  Treasury  bills  in the  period.from 
1964 through  1972 when  the  Treasurv  was  issuing  new  bills  at 
that  maturib.  He  concludes  that  the. description  ‘ihat  best  ‘fits 
the  CRSP  data  is that  the  premium  rises  monotonically  to about 
five  months  and  has  no  further  significant  change. 
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FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  19 premiums  for  privately  issued  securities  over.  his 
whole  sample  period  from  January  1967  to January 
198.5 are.close  to zero.,Fama,  however,  also divides 
his  sample  into .months  when  the  yield  curve  was 
monotonically  upward  sloping  and  months  when  the 
yield curve  was “humped”  (i.e initially rising and then 
falling).  He  finds ‘that  in  months  when  the  private 
yield  curve  was  upward  sloping,  the  average  term 
premium  was  positive  and  rose  with  maturity,-  and 
in months  when  the private  yield curve  was humpedi 
the  average  term  premium  initially  was  positive’but 
then.bedame  negative  at  the  longer  maturities. 
One  type  of, explanation  for  the  positive  average 
premium  in the bill market  focuses  on the preferences 
of  individual  investors.  Hicks  [1946,  pp.  144-Z) 
argues  that  investors  have  a preference  for  shorter; 
term  securities  because  of  the  greater  price  vola- 
tility  of  long-term  securities  when  interest  rates 
change.  In contrast,  he reasons  that  many  borrowers 
have  a preference  for  long-term  borrowing.  Hence, 
there  is a “constitutional  weakness”  on the  long  side 
of the  inark&  such  that  in equilibrium  investors  have 
tb  be  offered  a  premium  to  invest  iti  longer-term 
securities.  In  a  similar  vein,  Kessel  [1965,  p.  451 
argots  that  the ‘maiket  has  a preference  for shorter- 
term  securities  because  of their  greater  liquidity:  “The 
shorter’the  t&m  to maturity  of a security,  the  smaller 
is  its  vtilnerability’  to’ capital  loss,  and  hence  the 
greater  its liquidity  and the  smaller  the  yield  differen- 
tial  ,between  that  security  and  money.“31 
: 
More  recent  papers  have  analyzed  the  term 
premium  in ,the &ext  of individuals  who  maximize 
the  expected  utility  of their  lifetime  consumption.J* 
An  idea  that  comes  out  of this  literature  is that  the 
term  premium  is likely  to  be  positive  if unexpected 
capital  losses  (i.e.  ‘pdsitive  future  interest  rate  sur- 
prises)  are  generally  positively  correlated  with 
negative  consumption  surprises.  In other  words,  in- 
vestors  are  likely  to  demand  a higher  yield  on long- 
term  securities  if they  are  likely  to experience  unex- 
pected  capital  losses  when  times  are  unexpectedly 
bad  and  their  marginal  utility  of  consumption  is 
relatively  high. 
A  second  explanation  for  the  positive  average 
premium  in  the  bill  market,  suggested  by  Rowe, 
31  There  was  a huge  amount of literature on the  expectations 
theory  and  the  term  premium  in the  1960s  and  early  1970s.  For 
a review  of this  literature  see  Van  Horne  [ 1984,  Chapter  41 and 
Malkiel  [ 19701. 
32 For  an  example  of  this  approach  see  Sargent  [1987,  pp. 
102-1051:  Abken  [1990)  discuSses  this  literature. 
Lawler,  and  Cook  [1986,  pp.  9-101  and  Toevs  and 
Mond  [ 19881,  focuses  on the  unique  characteristics 
of the  market.  Treasury  bills  can  be  used  to  satisfy 
numerous  institutional  and  regulatory  requirements, 
such  as serving  as collateral  for tax and loan accounts 
at commercial  banks  and  satisfying  margin  ,require- 
m&s’  on  futures  contracts.  To  the  extent  that  the 
holding  period  for these  purpdses  tends  to be  short, 
investors  might  prefer  to  minimize  capital  risk  by 
ho!ding  short-term  bills  to  satisfy  them.  Moreover, 
the  Treasury  is  not  sensitive  to  interest  rates  at 
different  maturities  in its  supply  of bills,  so there  is 
no  pressure  from  the  supply  &de  to  equalize  the 
expected  cost  of issuing  bills at different  maturities. 
In contrast,  banks  might  be  expected,  to  issue  more 
three-month  CDs  if the expecttid  cost  of raising funds 
this  way  were  systematically  lower  than  the.cost  of 
raising  funds  by  issuing  six-month  CDs,  and  this 
behavior  would  raise  the  three-month  rate  relative 
to  the  six-month  rate  and  reduce  the  premium. 
Measuring  the  Behavior  of:the 
Term  Premium  over  Time 
A number  of approaches  have  been  taken  in  the 
literature  to  measure  the  behavior  of  the  term 
premium  over  time.  The  simplest  approach  is  to 
assume  that  the  forward  rate  premium  is an accurate 
representation  of  the, term  premium.  Suppose  the 
expected,  change  in  rates  at, any  point  in  time  is 
negligible  so that  the  forward.rate  premium  is com- 
pletely  dominated  by variation  in the  term  premium. 
Then,  as Fama, [  1986,  p.  isi]  suggests,  the  forward 
rate  premium  can  “provide  a  direct  picture  of  the 
behavior  of  the  expected  term...premium.”  As 
discussed  earlier,  ‘however,  the  Goldsmith-Nagan 
survey  data  suggest  that  at times, market  participants 
have  expected  large  changes  in rates.  If so,  then  in 
these  periods  the  forward  rate  premium  provides  an 
inaccurate  picture  of  the  term  premium. 
A second  approach  to measuring  the term  premium 
is to  subtract  the  expected  interest  rate  level  from 
the  Goldsmith-Nagan  survey  from  the  comparable 
forward  rate  at the  time  of the  survey.  Chart  3 shows 
(a) the  difference  between  the  forward  rate  on three- 
month  bills  three  months  ahead,  and  the  expected 
three-month  bill rate  three  months  ahead  and  (b) the 
difference  between  the  forward  rate  on threeymonth, 
bills six months  ahead.and  the  expected  three-month 
bill rate  six months  ahead.s3  The  chart  shows  a clear 
33  The  vertical lines  in Charts  3,4,  and  5 show  quarterly  business 
cycle  peaks  and  troughs.  Peaks  are  the  fourth-quarte;  of 1969, 
fourth  auarter  of. 1973.  first  auarter  of  1980.  and  third  Quarter 
L  L 
of 198 1. Troughs  are the  fourth  quarter  of 1970,  the  first quarter. 
of  1975,  third  quarter  of  1980,  and  the  fourth  quarter  of  1982. 
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Note:  The  dashed  line  is  the  difference  between  the  for- 
ward  and  expected  three-month  rates  six  months 
ahead.  The  solid  line  is  the  difference  between  the 
forward  and  expected  three-month  rates  three  months 
ahead.  The  shaded  areas  represent  recessions  (peak  to 
trough). 
tendency  for  the  survey  term  premiums  to  be  rela- 
tively high in recessions  and low in expansions.  (This 
tendency  was  captured  in  the  regression  results 
reported  in  Section  IV  by  the  signficant  negative 
coefficient  of  the  recession  dummy  variable.) 
Chart  4 shows  that  the  survey  term  premium  and 
the  forward  premium  generally  move  together,  but 
large  differences  occasionally  occur  when  the  survey 
indicates  large  expected  declines  in rates.  The  most 
striking  difference  in the  two  estimates  of the  term 
premium  is  in  the  period  from  late  1979  though 
mid-1982  when  interest  rates  were  unusually  high 
and were  expected  to fall by the  survey  participants. 
In this  situation  the  survey  term  premium  rose  well 
above  the  forward  rate  premium.  Chart  5 compares 
the  survey  premiums  for  bills  and  private  money 
market  securities.  The  private  premium  generally 
follows  the  same  pattern  as the  bill premium-rising 
in  recessions  and  falling  in  expansions-although 
occasionally  there  are  significant  differences  in  the 
two  premiums. 
A third  estimate  of the  term  premium  is the  for- 
ward  deviation,  i.e.  the  difference  between  the  for- 
ward  rate  and  the  subsequently  realized  spot  rate. 
As discussed  in Section  III, the forward  deviation  can 
be  decomposed  into  an expected  term  premium  and 
an, interest  rate  forecast  error.  Both  the  Goldsmith- 
Nagan  survey  data  and  futures  market  data  indicate 
that  market  participants  .have  had  little  ability  to 
forecast  rates  at the  three-  and  six-month  horizons. 
Chart  4 
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Note:  The  forward  rate  premium  is  the  forward  rate  on 
three-month  Treasury  bills three  months  ahead  minus 
the  current  three-month  spot  rate.  The  survey  term 
premium  is the  forward  rate  minus  the  expected  three- 
month  spot  rate  three  months  ahead.  Shaded  areas 
represent  recessions. 
As  a  result,  the  forward  deviation  is  an  extremely 
volatile  measure  dominated  by interest  rate  forecast 
errors. 
A  final  approach  used  to  estimate  the  term 
premium  is to employ  regression  methods  to generate 
“expected”  interest  rates  with data available to market 
participants  at  the  time  of  the  forecast.,  These 
Chart  5 
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Note:  The  term  premiums  are  the  difference  between 
the  forward  and  expected  three-month  spot  rates  three 
months  ahead.  Shaded  areas  represent  recessions. 
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neous  forward  rates to  calculate  estimates  of the  term 
premium.  Since these  forecasting  equations  have little 
power  to predict  changes  in interest  rates,  one  might 
expect  this approach  to provide  estimates  of the  term 
premium  that  are similar to the forward  rate premium. 
We  are not  aware,  however,  of any  studies  that  have 
made  this  comparison. 
Determinants  of  the 
Variable  Term  Premium 
The  estimates  of  the  term  premium  shown  in 
Charts  3-5 suggest  that  term  premiums  in the  money 
market  tend  to  be  low  in periods  of economic  ex- 
pansions  and  high  in  periods  of weakness.  This  is 
consistent  with  a  recent  conclusion  by  Fama  and 
French  [1989,  p.  431  that,  term  premiums  “move 
opposite  to  business  conditions,”  This  is  not  a 
universally  accepted  description  of the  behavior  of 
term  premiums,  however.  Numerous  variables  are 
correlated  with  economic  conditions,  and  the  charts 
might  be capturing  a correlation  of the  premium  with 
some  other  variable  such  as  the  level  of  interest 
rates.34  Moreover,  even  if one, accepts  the  descrip- 
tion  that  term  premiums  move  opposite  to business 
conditions  as accurate,  there  is still no generally  ac- 
cepted  explanation  for  why  term  premiums  rise 
around  recessions  and  fall  in  expansions. 
Numerous  papers  have  attempted  to  make 
judgments  about  the  determinants  of  the.  term 
premium  by  regressing  one  of the  measures  of the 
premium  described  above  on  various  possible  ex- 
planatory  variables .3s Two  explanatory  variables  often 
included  in  these  regressions  are  the  volatility  of 
interest  rates  and  the,level  of interest  rates.  Hicks 
[ 19461 reasons.that.the  term  premium  is compensa- 
tion  for  the  capital  risk  resulting  from  interest  rate 
movements  and,  therefore,  increases  in interest  rate 
34 For  example,  on the  basis  of the  Goldsmith-Nagan  survey  data 
and  a chart  similar  to  Chart  3,  Froot  [1989,  p.  299,  Figure  l] 
concludes  that  “the  surveys  suggest  that  term  premia  rose 
substantially  during  periods  of  high  interest  rate  volatility  [p. 
3001.”  He  also  concludes  that  the  survey  premia  “are  highly 
positively  correlated  with  nominal,  interest  rates  ,and  inflation 
[p.  303].“.Friedman  11979,  p.  9721 on  the  basis  of regressions 
using  the  Goldsmith-Nagan  data  from  September  1969 through 
March  1977 concludes  that  “the  results  make  clear that  the  basic 
relation  is between  the  term  premium  and  interest  rate  levels, 
not  economic  activity  .  .  .“. 
3s For  example  Friedman  I19791 uses  the  premium  calculated 
from  the  survey  data  as  the  dependent  variable  in  his  regres- 
sions,  Kessel  119651 uses  the  forward  deviation  in  his  regres- 
sions,  and  Pesando  [1975]  estimates  interest  rate  forecasting 
equations  to  calculate  an  estimate  of the  term  premium  to  use 
as  the  dependent  variable  in  his  regressions. 
volatility  should  increase  the  premium  demanded  by 
investors.  The  argument  that  the level of rates  should 
be  a determinant  of the  term  premium  is generally 
associated  with  Kessel  [ 1965,  pp.  25-261.  He  argues 
that  short-term  bills are better  money  substitutes  than 
long-term  bills, and since  an increase  in interest  rates 
increases  the  cost  of  holding  money,  the  yield  on 
short-term  bills  should  fall  relative  to  the  yield  on 
long-term  bills  when  rates  rise. 
Papers  that  find  the  volatility  of interest  .rates  to 
be  a significant  determinant  of the  premium  include 
Fama  [ 19761,  Heuson  [ 19881,  and  Lauterbach 
[ 19891 .s6 Papers  that  find  the  level  of rates  to  be  a 
determinant  of the  premium  include  Kessel  [ 19651, 
Pesando  [1975],  and  Friedman  [1979].  Other  ex- 
planatory  variables  that  have  been  used  in  studies 
of  the  premium  include  the  relative  supplies  of 
securities  at different  maturities,  the  unemployment 
rate,  industrial  production,  and  the  spread  between 
yields  on  high-  and  low-risk  securities.  As ,Shiller 
[ 1987,  pp.  56-571  concludes  in his  survey  article  on 
the  term  structure  of interest  rates:  “It  is difficult  to 
produce  a useful  summary  of [the] conflicting  results” 
from the  empirical  studies  of the  term  premium.  The 
main  conclusion  is that  no  consensus  has  emerged 
in the  literature  on what  macroeconomic  variable  the 
term  premium  is most  closely  related  to  or  on  why 
the  term  premium  varies  so  much.3’ 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The  studies  surveyed  in this  paper  find  that  over 
long  periods  of  time  the  yield  curve  from  three  to 
twelve  months  has  had  negligible  power  to  forecast 
interest  rates  three  and six months  in the future.  The 
36 Fama  119761 assumes  that  the  expected  real return  on  a one- 
month  Treasury  bill  is  constant  over  his  sample  period  and 
therefore  concludes  that  his  measure  of the  volatility  of interest 
rates  is capturing  the  positive  effect  of inflation  uncertainty  on 
expected  term  premiums  on  multimonth  bills. 
37 One  possibility  that  we  do not  discuss  here  is that  the  variable 
term  premium  results  from  factors  related  to  specific  Treasury 
bill  issues  and  maturities.  For  example,  Park  and  Reinganum 
[ 19861 find  that  Treasury  bill yields  maturing  at the  end  of the 
month  and  especially  atthe  end  of the  year-have  lower  yields 
than  surroundine  maturities.  and  Nelson  and  Siegel  119871 find 
evidence  of both  maturity-specific  and  issue-spe&id  effects  on 
bill yields.  Also,  it is also widely  believed  in the  financial  markets 
that  a shortage  or abundance  of a particular  bill issue  can  cause 
that  issue’s  yield  to  differ  significantly  from  the  yields  on  sur- 
rounding  maturities.  The  McCulloch  data  used  in  this  paper, 
however,  are  constructed  from  a  curve-fitting  technique  and 
therefore  should  generally  not  be  affected  by  such  factors. 
Moreover,  the  evidence  presented  earlier  in the  paper  suggests 
the  variable  term  premium  is pervasive  throughout  the  money 
market  and  not  just  due  to  special  factors  operating  in  the  bill 
market. 
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power  for the  one-month  ahead  rate,  however,  and 
the  yield  curve  from  one  to  five  years  has  had 
forecasting  power  for  the  one-year  rate  over  ‘the 
following  three  or  four  years. 
The  research  in this  area  has  suggested  two  broad 
reasons  for  the  poor  forecasting  poker  of the  yield 
curve  from  three  to twelve  months:The  first  is that 
the  variation  in the  term  premium  at the  three-  and 
six-month  horizons  has  been  substantial  relative  to 
the  variation  in the  expected  change  in  rates:The 
second  is that  even  when  market  participants  have 
forecasted  significant  changes  in interest  rates  at the 
three-  and  six-month  horizons;  their  forecasts  have 
been  poor  rit these  horizons.  ,’ 
An understanding  of how  market  participants  form 
monetary  policy  expectations  may  provide  insight 
into  some  of the  results  in this literature.  A monetary 
policy  explanation  for the  poor  forecasting  power  of 
the  yield  curve  from  three  to  twelve  months  is that 
market  participants  expect  changes  in  the  Fed’s 
federal.funds  rate  target  to be persistent.  According 
to  this  explanation,  three-,  six-,  and  twelve-month 
rates  tend  to  move  the  same  amount  in reaction  to 
changes  in  the  funds  rate  target  and,  therefore, 
changes  in the  slope  of the yield curve  over this range 
are  dominated  by  movement  in the  term  premium. 
The  forecasting  power  of the  yield  curve  out to three 
months  may reflect  the  ability  of market  participants 
to  forecast  over  short  horizons  the  reaction  of  the 
Fed  to  new  information  influencing  its  policy  deci- 
sions.  And  the  forecasting  power  of the  yield  curve 
from  one  to five years  may  partially  reflect  the  belief 
of market  participants  that  over  longer  periods  of time 
‘changes  in  the  funds  rate  target  are  likely  to  be 
reversed,  especially  after the  Fed  has raised  the funds 
rate  sharply  in  reaction  to  rising  ‘inflation. 
The  evidence  cited  in  this  paper  in  favor  of  a 
monetary  policy explanation  for the  regression  results 
is limited,  however,  and the  explanation  has not been 
* 
uruversally,  or’even  widely,  accepted.  There’is  also 
no  general  agreement  on  why  the  term  premium 
varies  so  much,,  although  the  Goldsmith-Nagan 
survey  data  strongly  suggest  that  the  premium  rises 
when  economic  conditions  deteriorate.  A brief assess- 
ment  of the  literature  surveyed  in this  paper  is that 
it has done  a good job of documenting  the  forecasting 
power  of various  parts  of the  yield  curve,  and  it has 
suggested  some  plausible  and  interesting  answers  to 
some  of  the  major  questions  in  this  area.  A  com- 
prehensive  explanation  for these  questions,  however, 
‘awaits  further  research. 
APPENDIXI 
INTERESTRATECONVERSIONS 
All interest  rates  in the paper  are continuously  com- 
pounded  annual  rates.  No  conversion  is  necessary 
for  the,  McCulloch  .Treasury  bill  rate  data,  which 
come  in this  form.  Three-month  Treasury  bill  rate 
forecasts  from  the‘Goldsmith-Nagan  survey  are  on 
a 360-day  discount  basis,  however,  as  are  all com- 
mercial  paper  rates  used  in  the  paper.  Eurodollar, 
CD,  and  federal  funds  rates  are  quoted  on  a simple 
interest  360-day  basis.  Prices  per  $1  of return  are 
calculated  from  the  quoted  yields,  Q,  u,sing  the 
formulas: 
for  bills  and  commercial  paper  and 
P  =  l/[(Q/lOO)(t/360)  +  11  (2) 
for Eurodollars,  CDs,  and  federal  funds  rates.  “t” is 
the. days  from  settlement  to  maturity:  .30,  90,  and 
180  days.  for-  commercial  paper,  CDs,  and 
Eurodollars;  91  days  for  Treasury  bills;  and  1 day 
for federal funds;  Prices  are converted  to continuously 
compounded  yields  using  the  formula: 
. 
r  =  1(365/t)lnP  '(3) 
P=l  -  [(Q/lOO)~(t/360)1  ,:  (1)  where  1nP is  the  natural  logarithm  of  P. 
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THECOEFFICIENT.OFTHEFORWARD&ATEPREMIUM 
INTHESTANDARDRE,GRESSION  : 
The  standard  regression  equation  .is: 
Denote  the  ‘variance  of  x  as  d(x),  .the  standard 
deviation  as  a(x),  and  the  correlation  coefficient 
between  x  and  y  as  p.  Recall  that  cov(x,y)  = 
pa(x  Then  equation  (7)  can  be  written: 
r(3:t+3)  -  r3  =  a  +  b[f(6,3)  -  r3] 
+  u:t+3  (1) 
To  simplify  the  notation  rewrite  this  as: 
Ar  =  a  +  b(FP)  +  u:t+3  (2) 
where  Ar  is the  rate  change  and  FP  is the  forward 
rate  premium.  Recall  also  that  the  forward  rate 
premium  can  be  decomposed  into  the.expected  rate 
change  and  the  expected  term  premium,  8,  and 
the  actual  change  in the  interest  rate  can  be  decom- 
posed  into  the  expected  change  and  a  forecasi 
error,  e: 
FP  .r  E(Ar)  +  8  (3) 
Ar  =  E(Ar)  +  e  0 
The  probability  limit  (abbreviated  as  plt)  of  the 
ordinary  least  squares  estimate  of b in equation  (2) is: 
plt  b  =  cov(FP,  Ar) 
(5) 
var(FP) 
Substituting  (3)  and  (4)  into  (5)  yields: 
plt  b  = 
cov]E(Ar)  + 8,  E(Ar)  + ej 
var[E(Ar)  +0] 
=  cov(E(Ar)  +8,  E(Ar)] 
var [  E(Ar)  + 01 
+  cov[E(Ar)  +8,  e] 
var[E(Ar)  +e] 
(6) 
Suppose  ‘the  rational  expectations  assumption  is 
valid.  Then  the  forecast  error,  e,  is  not  correlated 
with  information  available  at  the  time  of  the  fore- 
cast,  which  includes  the  expected  change  in rates  and 
the  expected  premium.  Then  the  second  term  on 
the  right-hand  side  of equation  (6)  equals  0 and  we 
get  the  expression: 
pit b  =  cov[WAd  +e,  Wdl 
var(E(Ar)  +t?] 
(7) 
plt  b  = 
oa[E(Ar)]  +  cov[e,E(Ar)] 
d[E(Ar)]  +  d(0)  +  Zcov[E(Ar),B] 
c?[E(Ar)]  +  pc@ja[E(Ar)] 
=  B[E(Ar)]  +  &J)  +  Zpa[E(Ar)]@3) 
(8) 
This  is  the,expression  in  Hardouvelis  [ 1988,  p. 
3421.  It  is, also  similar  to the  expression  in Mankiw 
and  Miron  [ 1986,  ,p.  2191,  except  that  the  term 
premium  in their  framework  is equal  to  one-half  the 
premium.above.  Note  that  the  probability  limit  of 
b  is  one  if the  premium  is  a constant  and  one-half 
if the  standard  deviation  of the  term  premium  equals 
the  standard  deviation  of  the  expected  change  in 
rates. 
Now  .substitute  equation  (4)  into  (5)  to  get: 
plt  b  =  cov(FP,  E(Ar)  +  e) 
var(FP) 
=  cov(FP,  E(A))  +  cov(FP,e) 
var(FP) 
(9) 
Substituting  (3)  into  (9)  yields: 
pit  b  _  cov(FP,  FP-8)  +  cov(FP,e) 
var(FP) 
‘=  var(FP)  -  cov(FP,B)  +  cov(FP,e) 
var(FP) 
=  l- 
cov(FP,B)  +  cov(FP,e)  (1 o) 
var(FP)  var(FP) 
Equation  (10)  says  that  a positive  correlation  of the 
term  premium  with  the  forward  rate  premium  or  a 
negative  correlation  of forecast  errors  with  the  for- 
ward  rate  premium  will reduce  the  coefficient  of the 
forward  rate  premium  below  the  value  of  one 
predicted  by  the  expectations  theory. 
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